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Drug Development and the Public Health
Mission: Collaborative Challenges at the FDA,
NIH, and Academic Medical Centers
SHEILA R. SHULMANt AND ANDREA KUETTELtt
In creating a regime of food and drug regulation, Roosevelt and
Congress were establishing the principle that it was now the job of
government not just to champion commerce but also to intervene
when it got out of hand. 1
Given the pervasive concerns about the influence of industry over
government, drug safety assessment might flourish better in a
freestanding non- governmental organization. 2
INTRODUCTION
Allegations of "coziness" between the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) and the pharmaceutical
industry tend to accompany times of crisis at the agency.
The opposing dynamics reflected in the quotes above are
symptomatic of a longstanding struggle over the FDA's
relationship with the powerful industrial sectors it
regulates. Less obvious are the layers of overlapping
relationships that link the broader biomedical research
community, the pharmaceutical industry, and the FDA.
f Sheila R. Shulman, LLB, MPH, is Research Associate Professor at the
University at Buffalo Law School and School of Public Health and Health
Professions. She also directs the Law School's JD/MPH program.
tt Andrea Kuettel, Adjunct Faculty, University at Buffalo School of Public
Health.
1. See PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA'S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS,
AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION xii (2003).
2. JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 374 (2004).
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A recent confluence of events involving prescription
drugs has once again triggered concerns that the FDA's
regulatory culture has forced the Agency's public health
mandate onto the back burner, favoring the interests of
pharmaceutical manufacturers. 3 The events in one way or
another involve sensitive topics intimately linked to
broader public health issues. For example, anxiety was
provoked by, among other things, protracted discussions
and perceived delays in controversial labeling changes for
antidepressant drugs and a potential link to adolescent
suicides;4 by a survey report from the Department of Health
and Human Services Inspector General suggesting FDA
scientists at times feel overwhelmed by application review
timelines, and pressured to recommend approval of new
drugs despite reservations about safety, effectiveness or
quality;5 and most recently by a series of drug safety
concerns linked to widely used prescription medications
that suggested passivity and lapses in the FDA's oversight
of marketed products. 6 Proposals for an independent office
3. See FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong. (2004) (opening statement of Sen. Chuck
Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on Fin.) ("It also looks like the FDA allowed
itself to be manipulated by Merck on labeling changes that became necessary
after a review by Merck that's known as the VIGOR trial. . . . One of my
concerns is that the FDA has a relationship with drug companies that is too
cozy."); Gardiner Harris, Drug Regulators are Trying to Quash Study, Senator
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2005, at A13; Kathleen Kerr, New FDA Board Has
Its Critics (Feb. 16, 2005) ("FDA critics questioned whether the new Drug
Safety Oversight Board would be independent and have real clout, with some
charging the agency remains too close to industry."), at http://www.newsday.
com.
4. See Press Release, FDA, FDA Launches a Multi-Pronged Strategy to
Strengthen Safeguards for Children Treated With Antidepressant Medications,
Pub. No. P04-97 (Oct. 15, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/
news/2004/NEW01124.html; Public Health Advisory, FDA, Suicidality in
Children and Adolescents Being Treated With Antidepressant Medications (Oct.
15, 2004) (directing all manufacturers of anti-depressant drugs to include a
black boxed, expanded warning regarding heightened risk of suicidal ideation),
available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/antidepressants/SSRIPHA200410.
htm.
5. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
FDA's REVIEW PROCESS FOR NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS: A MANAGEMENT REVIEW 9-
12 (Mar. 2003) (hereinafter "FDA'S REVIEW PROCESS"), at http://oig.hhs.gov/
oei/reports/oei-01-01-00590.pdf.
6. See FDA's Drug Approval Process: Up to the Challenge?: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 108th Cong. (2005)
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of drug safety, as well as more severe criminal penalties for
concealment of adverse drug events, were once again on the
table.7 On April 27, 2005, Senators Dodd and Grassley
introduced a bill, The Food and Drug Administration Safety
Act of 2005, that would create a new safety center within
FDA, increase surveillance of medical devices, provide
additional civil penalty authority, and grant authority to
restrict direct to consumer promotion of newly approved
drugs.8
The high profile nature of the controversies and their
occurrence over a relatively concentrated period served to
reinvigorate criticisms of the FDA's regulatory culture.
(statement of Sandra Kweder, Deputy Dir., Office of New Drugs, Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation and Research, FDA); Eric J. Topol, Failing the Public Health, 351
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1707 (Oct. 21, 2004); Drug Withdrawals, WALL ST. J., Sept.
30, 2004, available at http://online.wsj.com; Press Release, FDA, FDA Issues
Public Health Advisory on Tysabri, a New Drug for MS, Pub. No. P05-07 (Feb.
28, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2005/NEW
01158.html; Talk Paper, FDA, FDA Issues Public Health Advisory
Recommending Limited Use of Cox-2 Inhibitors, Pub. No. T04-61 (Dec. 23,
2004), available at http://www.fda.govfbbs/topics/ANSWERS/2004/ANS01336.
html; Press Release, FDA, FDA Statement on Vioxx and Recent Allegations and
the Agency's Continued Commitment to Sound Science and Peer Review (Nov.
17, 2004), available at http://www.fda.govfbbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01136.
html.
7. See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Accountability Act of
2005, H.R. 870, 109th Cong. (2005) ("To amend the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act to provide enhanced criminal penalties for certain violations of the
Act involving knowing concealment of evidence of a serious adverse drug
experience, and for other purposes."); Avorn, supra note 2, at 373 (suggesting an
allocation of functions that would separate the regulating agency from the
organization that investigates questions of safety, similar to the model seen in
the separation of the Federal Aviation Administration (the regulator) and the
National Transportation Safety Board (the safety investigator)). See generally
Brian L. Strom, Potential for Conflict of Interest in the Evaluation of Suspected
Adverse Drug Reactions, 292 JAMA 2643 (Dec. 1, 2004). The FDA responded by
announcing the creation of a new Drug Safety Oversight Board, which will
consist of medical experts from government agencies appointed by the FDA
Commissioner. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA, MANUAL OF
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (May 4, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/
mapp/4151-3.pdf; Memorandum from Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman,
United States Senate Committee on Finance (Apr. 7, 2005), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2005/prgO40705.pdf. The Board will be
part of the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research. See id.
8. Food and Drug Administration Safety Act of 2005, S. 930, 109th Cong.,
available at http://www.theorator.com/billsl09/s930.html.
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Questions surfaced from consumer advocates 9 and members
of Congress about the essential nature of the agency-
industry relationship, reflecting a nagging sense of unease
that the FDA had become too entangled in the interests of
its regulated constituencies, and in the process had short-
changed public health interests. FDA officials themselves
have queried whether their independence may have, in
some way, been compromised by the need to work more
closely with industry. 10
Given the nature of the concerns and the inherent
implication that the FDA-industry alliance has been tainted
in some way, it seems fair to ask what might constitute
"coziness" in the context of the FDA's work, and what
institutional parameters guide interactions between the
FDA and the industrial sectors over which the agency
exercises broad regulatory authority. These questions are
not new. Since the earliest days of federal drug regulation
in the U.S., similar inquiries have emerged as part of what
has been described as a "virtual tidal wave"" of
9. See, e.g., Petition from Dawn Jennings-Peterson, Staff Researcher, and
Sidney M. Wolfe, Director, Public Citizen's Health Research Group, to Lester M.
Crawford, Acting Commissioner, FDA, Petition to Remove Cox-2 Inhibitors
Celecoxib (Celebrex) and Valdecoxib (BEXTRA) From the Market, Pub. No.
1720 (Jan. 24, 2005), available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/
release.cfm?ID=7358.
10. See Susan Okie, What Ails the FDA? 352 N. ENG. J. MED. 1063 (Mar. 17,
2005); Jim Drinkard, Label Quibble Helped Cause Vioxx Lapse, USA TODAY,
Mar. 2, 2005, at 8D (reporting on the congressional testimony of Sandra
Kweder, Deputy Director, Office of New Drugs, FDA, before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, Mar. 1, 2005, in which
she indicated there was a "lapse" in the system that prevented prescribing
physicians from promptly receiving notice of serious adverse drug reactions);
Murray M. Lumpkin, Accelerating Drug Development: Regulatory Initiatives in
the USA, Presentation at the Drug Information Association (DIA) Euromeeting
in Nice, France (Mar. 9, 2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/presentdia-
nice2000/dianicel/. Among other questions posed at the DIA Euromeeting by
Dr. Lumpkin, then Deputy Center Director, FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research, were the following: "Is FDA a tax-payer funded drug
development consulting firm?" and "At what point has FDA been co-opted into
the development program such that it affects FDA's ability to be objective in its
regulatory oversight decisions at later point in time - like when the NDA is
submitted for review?" Lumpkin, supra, at 14-15.
11. Peter Barton Hutt, Progress in New Drug Regulation, 5 CLINICAL'RES.
PRAc. & DRUG REGULATORY REGULATION 307, 310 (1987). The article describes
six broad categories of events or concerns effectively triggering the inquiries:
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investigations and recommendations related to the agency's
work.12 The FDA has been called "the most closely watched
federal regulatory agency," 13 and its regulatory activities
"the most thoroughly investigated and studied program of
government regulation in history."1 4 The FDA-industry
dynamic has figured prominently in a number of these
inquiries, in some instances reflecting concerns that the
agency was dominated by industry,15 and in others, that the
agency was insufficiently cooperative and interactive with
industry.16
The FDA of 2005, however, is a very different
enterprise than it was even fifteen or twenty years ago. 17
Cumulatively over the past two decades, the agency has
been required to respond to an unrelenting series of
challenges: the emergence of AIDS and bioterrorism; the
increased volume and complexity of an expanding workload;
the need to develop regulatory pathways for novel
technologies emerging in the biosciences,' 8  and by
drug safety; ethical issues; FDA administration and resources; advisory
committees; the FDA review process; and competitiveness issues. See id.
12. See Peter Barton Hutt, Investigations and Reports Respecting FDA
Regulation of New Drugs (Part I). 33 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND
THERAPEUTICS 537 (1983).
13. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FINAL REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (May 1991).
14. Sheila R. Shulman et al., Studies and Inquiries into the FDA Regulatory
Process: An Historical Review, 29 DRUG INFO. J. 385 (1995). See generally Hutt,
supra note 11.
15. See Examin. of the Pharm. Indus., 1973-74: Hearings Before the S.
Subcomm. on Health, Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 93d Cong., pts. 1-6
(1973-74).
16. See LASAGNA COMMITTEE, NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, FINAL REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO REVIEW CURRENT PROCEDURES FOR APPROVAL OF
NEW DRUGS FOR CANCER AND AIDS (Aug. 15, 1990).
17. See Eve E. Slater, Today's FDA, 352 N. ENG. J. MED. 293 (2005).
18. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., DRUG PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO
BIOTERRORISM, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drugprepare/default.htm.;
CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR FDA REVIEW STAFF AND SPONSORS, CONTENT AND
REVIEW OF CHEMISTRY, MANUFACTURING, AND CONTROL (CMC) INFORMATION FOR
HUMAN GENE THERAPY INVESTIGATIONAL NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS (INDs), DRAFT
GUIDANCE, (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/
gtindcmc.pdf.; CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA, U.S. DEP'T
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additional statutory obligations that have placed rigorous
demands on its resources. 19 The new programs are infused
with mandates and initiatives that invite, and at times
require, a new level of partnership between FDA and
industry. The inherent complexities of this collaborative
enterprise have become more obvious and potentially
problematic as the agency has implemented new statutory
programs, including the prescription drug user fee scheme,
and a range of other initiatives designed to speed the
development and review of prescription drugs. These
changes in the late 1980s and 1990s, together with prompts
from Congress for the FDA and pharmaceutical firms to
work more closely, may have created an inherently weaker
FDA, and as a consequence, new public health problems. 20
The process of drug development is multi-tiered, with a
host of actors influencing the outcome at various stages.
The work product contained in a new drug application
ultimately received by the FDA has numerous sources,
many of them overlapping in intriguing, often indirect,
alliances. As the FDA has changed over the past twenty-
five years, so have members of the broader biomedical
research community. Much of the initial development of
new drug therapies takes place at the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) and academic medical centers. Industry
collaboration with researchers in the development process
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., XENOTRANSPLANTATION ACTION PLAN (June 29,
2004) ("Xenotransplantation is any procedure that involves the transplantation,
implantation, or infusion into a human recipient of either (a) live cells, tissues,
or organs from a nonhuman animal source, or (b) human body fluids, cells,
tissues or organs that have had ex vivo contact with live nonhuman animal
cells, tissues or organs."), available at http://www.fda.gov/cber/xap/xap.htm.
19. See The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (substantially amending the Federal,
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA); implementing major changes in FDA
practices with respect to all products regulated by the FDA; introducing new
regulatory programs, including, among others, a major initiative for pediatric
drug studies; and setting a new evidentiary standard for health care economic
information disseminated by manufacturers about the relative outcomes of
using a specific drug compared to an alternate drug or intervention)
(hereinafter "FDA Modernization Act"); Richard A. Merrill, Modernizing the
FDA: An Incremental Revolution, 18 HEALTH AFF. 96 (1999); Talk Paper, FDA,
2004 FDA Accomplishments, Pub. No. T05-09 (Mar. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.fda.govfbbs/topics/ANSWERS/ 2005/ANS01346.html.
20. Melissa Marie Bean, Fatal Flaws in the Food and Drug Administration's
Drug-Approval Formula, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 881, 887.
668 [Vol. 53
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also has been the result of a changing statutory landscape
during this period, a time notable for its great productivity
in terms of new therapies, patents, and revenue sources.
More recently, however, there has been concern that
collaboration with industry has morphed into its own form
of coziness, and that the risks to scientific objectivity, data
integrity, and patient safety threaten to undermine the
public health mission of NIH, academic medical centers,
and the FDA, which relies on their work.
This paper examines the overlapping and potentially
conflicting roles assumed by the FDA, FDA Advisory
Committee members, the pharmaceutical industry, and
researchers at NIH and academic medical centers
responsible for the laboratory (pre-clinical) and clinical
research that constitute the foundation of marketing
applications submitted to the FDA. Part I reviews several of
the institutional forces and statutory initiatives that compel
FDA-industry alliances and render ongoing dialogue an
essential ingredient of the process, but which may
simultaneously contribute to a blurring of roles. Part I
concludes with a discussion of the influence exerted
indirectly by drug companies through the FDA Advisory
Committee system, as the conflict of interest of panel
members continues to threaten the credibility of committee
recommendations. Part II moves to the role conflicts that
arise when scientists and their institutions have an
entrepreneurial stake in therapy development. The nature
of collaborative interests among NIH, its scientists and
industry is discussed in the context of recent public scrutiny
regarding scientists' financial remuneration by industry,
along with the newly issued regulations addressing these
interests. Part II then examines similar relationships that
researchers in academic medicine and their institutions
have with the pharmaceutical industry, as well as current
and proposed methods for managing conflicts of interest.
20051 669
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PART I
A. Regulatory Culture
Like all modern administrative agencies, the FDA
exists within a statutory environment. 21 Its work is
circumscribed by the legislative authorization granted by
Congress in the FDA's organic statute, the Federal Food,
Drug, Cosmetic Act (the FFDCA),22 other general laws
applicable to administrative actions, regulations
promulgated under those statutes, guidance documents,23
and internal programs and policies. Using the language and
constructs of the statute creatively, the agency has adapted
to the enormous changes in science, health policy, and
technology. 24
A useful starting point in thinking about the work of
the FDA is the core directive setting out the Agency's
mission.25 Codified in 1997, the mission statement requires
the agency to promote and protect the public health
through prompt and efficient review of clinical research,
and by ensuring that marketed products meet statutory
and regulatory standards. 26 The mission directive and the
common sense demands of the process anticipate
collaboration at the most fundamental levels of drug
development. When appropriate, the agency is required to
consult and cooperate with external groups, including
manufacturers. 27 FDA officials have promoted this concept
of partnership with industry. 28 The precise parameters of
21. See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
LAW SYSTEM, CASES AND MATERIALS 147 (1998).
22. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52
Stat. 1040 (1938), (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2004)).
23. See Annual Comprehensive List of Guidance Documents at the Food and
Drug Administration, 70 Fed. Reg. 824 (Jan. 5, 2005).
24. See FRED H. DEGNAN, FDA'S CREATIVE APPLICATION OF THE LAw (2000).
25. See The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act § 406
(amending the FFDCA to integrate an agency mission statement for the first
time in the history of the FDA).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Sharon Smith Holston, Contact with the FDA - Ground Rules for
Industry and Constraints for Agency Personnel When Interacting with Industry,
48 FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 35 (1993).
670 [Vol. 53
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the anticipated collaboration or working relationship
inevitably shift in response to pressures from Congress,
industry, and consumer groups. Given the essential nature
of the joint undertakings, what safeguards or firewalls,
other than basic ethical guidelines, disclosure of financial
interests, and professional standards, are in place to protect
the agency's core public health mission and the integrity of
the process? 29
Empirical studies have examined bureaucratic decision-
making in regulatory agencies, but offer little consensus on
the key influencing factors.30 However, in the case of the
FDA, the science-based nature of the work clearly is a
powerful factor shaping its operational, policy, and
procedural mechanisms. 3 1 The observation that information
is the life-blood of regulatory policy has intriguing
implications in the context of the FDA.32 The complexity of
29. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.101-.902 (2005) (establishing uniform rules of
ethical conduct applicable to all executive branch personnel); 5 C.F.R. §
5501.101 (2005) (establishing supplemental standards of ethical conduct and
financial disclosure requirements for employees of the Department of Health
and Human Services, revising the definition of "significantly regulated
organization" and requiring an annual reporting by all employees of financial
and other information concerning outside activities and a supplemental
disclosure by all FDA and NIH employees with respect to prohibited financial
interests); 21 C.F.R. § 19 (2004) (establishing standards of conduct and conflicts
of interest applicable to all FDA employees).
30. See Mary Olson, Substitution in Regulatory Agencies: FDA Enforcement
Alternatives, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376, 377 (1996) (examining the impact on
FDA enforcement actions of feedback from external groups, including Congress,
consumers, and industry); William F. Pederson, Contracting with the Regulated
for Better Regulation, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1067 (2001) (advocating the use of
regulatory reform contracts to avoid the regulatory dysfunction that results
from the failure of agencies to distinguish between the ends a regulatory
program seeks to achieve and the means used to achieve them); Joseph P.
Tomain & Sidney A. Shapiro, Analyzing Government Regulation, 49 ADMIN. L.
REV. 377, 391 (1997) (noting that although an agency's capacity to act is
affected by its institutional framework and legal constraints, non-legal factors
such as bureaucratic culture and agency resources come into play). The authors
advocate a model that balances policy, political and institutional factors as
opposed to a public choice model in which regulatory decisions serve the
interests of the regulated industries.
31. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing
Procedures: Evaluating the FDA's Public Board of Inquiry, 1986 DUKE L.J. 288,
291 (1986).
32. See Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational
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the FDA's job is heightened by the agency's dependence on
scientific data and information provided predominantly by
the companies it regulates. Along with this dependency
comes the potential for the manipulation of data and for
companies to withhold or minimize negative information
about their drugs.33 The ability of FDA officials to detect
problematic data and subtle biases has been questioned for
some time.34 The notion of agency "capture" is never far
from the surface.3 5 The partnership construct carries with it
an implication of influence and bias, the risk of regulatory
capture, and results in regulatory policy that favors the
interest of industry.36 Coglianese and his colleagues argue
that the push for increased transparency in the regulatory
process results in an information deficit due to industry's
reticence to share information in a more open fashion. 37
They argue that although transparency may be one way to
combat the dangers of cozy relationships between
regulators and industry, it also makes it more difficult for
agencies to most effectively work with individual
Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277 (noting that
regulators need detailed and accurate information about the operations of
private business enterprises to understand the scope and cause of regulatory
problems, and to craft effective solutions to them). The authors also point out
that the regulated firms have an incentive to share favorable, self-serving
information. See id. at 278-79.
33. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Beyond Buckman: Wrongful Manipulation of
the Regulatory Process in the Law of Torts, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 549, 564 (2002).
"Fraud on the FDA" is a litigation theory argued in state courts alleging FDA
approval had been granted on the basis of misleading data filed by the
sponsoring company, in the absence of which no FDA approval would have been
forthcoming. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001),
in which the Supreme Court ruled that private FDA fraud allegations in state
tort litigation conflicted with the FDA's regulatory authority to police
compliance. See also James M. Beck, 'Fraud on the FDA' Liability?, UPDATE
FoOD & DRUG L. REG. & EDUC. 33 (Jan./Feb. 2004); Bean, supra note 27, at 892
(providing case studies of two drugs (Rezulin and Fen-Phen) approved on the
basis of misinformation and manipulation of FDA officials). Often the fraud
remains undetected until post-marketing problems emerge. Id. at 891.
34. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Divorcing Profit Motivation From New Drug
Research: A Consideration of Proposals to Provide the FDA with Reliable Test
Data, 1978 DUKE L. J. 155, 170 (1978).
35. McGarity, supra note 33, at 564.
36. See Coglianese, supra note 32 (arguing that the push for increased
transparency in the regulatory process results in an information deficit due to
industry's reticence to share information in a more open fashion).
37. Id. at 334.
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companies, to exploit asymmetries of interest, and to
engage in informal interactions, which may be the source of
the most salient information.38 Given the informational
dependence, interactions and collaborations at various
levels of drug development may result in biases and
informational deficits that are further exacerbated by
initiatives to move drugs to market faster.
B. Risk Privatization:39 Initiatives to Speed Drugs to
Market
Beginning in the mid-1980s, a period dominated by the
initial confrontation with AIDS and by the need to respond
to demands from advocates for AIDS patients, the FDA
formally implemented two sets of initiatives to ease and
expand access to certain drugs for the treatment of serious
and life-threatening conditions.40  The AIDS crisis
essentially gave the FDA political license to move in new
directions, with Congress directing the FDA to develop a
partnership with pharmaceutical companies to expedite the
review of AIDS drugs. 41 Responding to what one FDA
official referred to as "a strong sense of hurry-up,"42 drug
development protocols that deviated from traditional
practices were designed not only for AIDS therapies, but
also for a range of drugs for life threatening or seriously
38. Id. at 341. The authors point out that "virtually no analytic attention
has been paid to the way regulators play the regulatory game to overcome their
informational disadvantage." See Coglianese, supra note 32, at 342.
39. See generally, JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE 23, 36, 48
(2002). Risk privatization is a concept used by Hacker in the economic context
to refer to the gradual erosion of protective government programs and the
simultaneous decline in the economic vitality of middle income individuals due
in part to longer periods of unemployment, more problematic access to health
insurance, and more vulnerable pensions. See id. The term has been adopted
here to refer to the erosion of the FDA safety net, and the transfer to patients of
greater risk and uncertainty about the safety and efficacy of new drugs.
40. See Sheila R. Shulman, Jeffrey S. Brown, The Food and Drug
Administration's Early Access and Fast-Track Approval Initiatives: How Have
They Worked?, 50 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 503 (1995).
41. Bean, supra note 20, at 881.
42. Robert J. Temple, A Regulatory Authority's Opinion About Surrogate
Endpoints, CLIN. MEASUREMENT & DRUG EVALUATION 3 (1995).
6732005]
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debilitating conditions. 43 The regulatory schemes represent
the emergence of an important historical phase in drug
development in the United States. 44 Both are characterized
by earlier and more intense collaboration between FDA and
industry, and by marked privatization of drug-associated
risk.45 The end product of an abbreviated development
period is a less well-developed safety and effectiveness
profile, and a more uncertain risk-benefit analysis that
ultimately shifts a greater degree of risk to seriously ill
patients. In fact, it has been argued that as a result of the
expedited processes, political influence, and a too-cozy
relationship between the FDA and corporations, a new
public health crisis has been created. 46
The first set of initiatives are those that provide for the
distribution of certain investigational drugs outside of, but
concurrent with, traditional clinical trial protocols (such as
the treatment IND47 and parallel track programs) 48 . The
intent reflects a treatment-research duality to make
promising investigational drugs available to patients for
treatment purposes earlier in the development process, and
to obtain additional data on the drug's safety and
effectiveness. 49  Although the practice of releasing
investigational drugs for treatment purposes was not new
in 1987, the programs represented an expansion and
43. See Sheila R. Shulman, Maria J. Wood-Armany, Accelerating Access to
Cancer Drugs, 2 J. BIOLAw & BUSINESS 38 (1999). In 1996, after a decade in
which the regulatory focus favored AIDS drugs, the FDA designed an initiative
("Reinventing the Regulation of Cancer Drugs") specifically directed toward
early access and accelerated approval for investigational cancer therapies. See
id.
44. See Shulman, supra note 43, at 503.
45. See generally HACKER, supra note 39, at 36, 48.
46. See Bean, supra note 20, at 886 (asserting that the traditional FDA
approval process, while slower was more effective at delivering safer medicines
to the public).
47. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (1995); Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and
Biological Drug Product Regulations: Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,
466 (May 22, 1987).
48. See Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a
Parallel Track Mechanism for People with AIDS and Other HIV-Related
Diseases, 57 Fed. Reg. 13, 250 (Apr. 15, 1992).
49. Shulman, supra note 43, at 505.
674 [Vol. 53
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codification of existing procedures. 50 The second set of
initiatives provides mechanisms to expedite both drug
development (Subpart E procedures)51 and FDA review
(Accelerated Approval). 52 The former provides for the
telescoping of phases two and three of clinical development;
the latter permits FDA marketing approval on the basis of
a change in a surrogate endpoint, such as a blood cell count
or tumor reduction, representing the sharpest deviation
from the evidentiary requirements for FDA marketing
approval. 53 To further flesh out a drug's portfolio, post-
marketing or phase four studies to validate the surrogate or
clinical endpoints may be requested at the time of FDA
approval. 54 Although failure to comply with this request
may result in the expedited withdrawal of the drug from
the market, 55 the FDA has not exercised its discretion to do
so even though the studies are more often not completed. 56
Major amendments to the FDCA in 1997 codified the
treatment investigational (IND) expanded access
program, 57 and the accelerated (fast track) approval
50. See Sheila R. Shulman & Drusilla S. Raiford, FDA Regulations Provide
Broader Access to Unapproved Drugs, 30 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 585
(1990).
51. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.80-88 (1999).
52. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.500-.560 (1999).
53. See FFDCA § 505(d) (establishing the evidentiary standard for FDA
approval of prescription drugs to require substantial evidence from "adequate
and well-controlled" clinical trials that the drug will have the effect it is
represented to have). The safety standard is satisfied by the conduct of
"adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable" to show the drug is safe
for the intended use. Id.
54. See id. § 506((b)(2)(A), (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2005)).
55. See id.
56. See Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Panel Weighs Fate of a Drug for Cancer,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2005, at A6; Letter from Larry Sasich, Staff Researcher,
Peter Lurie, Deputy Director, and Sidney Wolfe, Director, Public Citizen's
Health Research Group, to Jane Henney, Commissioner, FDA, The Drug
Industry's Performance in Finishing Postmarketing Research (Phase IV)
Studies, A Public Citizen's Health Research Group Report, Pub. No. 1520 (Apr.
13, 2000), available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/printrelease.cfm?ID
=6721.
57. See FFDCA § 561(c), 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb (2005).
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initiative.5 8 For drugs designated as fast track products, 59
ongoing dialogue, protocol review, and frequent meetings
are intrinsic to the process. 60 Although industry-FDA
dialogue has become a more formalized feature of the drug
development process generally, 61 the joint FDA-industry
investment in fast track drug development calls for
intensive contact through meetings and written
communications with the FDA reviewing division. 62 The
goal here is to improve the efficiency of preclinical and
clinical development, and to achieve early agreement on the
design of the major clinical efficacy studies needed to
support approval. 63 However, timing expectations, a critical
variable in this process, together with the joint agency-
industry development commitment for fast track drugs,
hold the potential for not only a shift in the relationship
equilibrium between FDA and industry, but also for
investment bias and a more profound informational deficit.
The fragility of the new regulatory pathways recently
became evident following problematic events with two
drugs approved under the accelerated approval regulations.
Tysabri, a drug for the treatment of multiple sclerosis was
withdrawn after only three months on the market,
following the deaths of two patients from a rare brain
58. See The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 112
(consolidating and codifying Subpart E and the accelerated approval
regulations providing for fast-track designation). The designation request is
submitted to FDA by the drug sponsor; FDA must respond within sixty
calendar days. See FFDCA § 506(a)(2)-(3), 21 U.S.C. 356 (2005).
59. Fast tracking is a development pathway designed to ease and expedite
the development and marketing of drugs intended for the treatment of serious
or life-threatening conditions for which therapeutic agents are nonexistent or, if
available, may be less than optimally effective. FFDCA § 506, 21 U.S.C. § 356
(2005).
60. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FAST TRACK DRUG
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS-DESIGNATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND APPLICATION
REVIEW (July 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/5645fnl.pdf
61. See FDA, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., INNOVATION OR
STAGNATION: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW
MEDICAL PRODUCTS (Mar. 16 2004) (hereinafter "INNOVATION OR STAGNATION"),
available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/criticalpath/whitepaper.html.
62. See FDA PRESS RELEASE GUIDANCE, supra note 60.
63. See id.
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infection.64 Additionally, in post-approval studies, Iressa, a
drug for small-cell lung cancer, failed to demonstrate an
ability to prolong survival rates in patients when compared
with a placebo. 65 The signal here is that it may be time for
Congress and the agency to reassess the shift in FDA
operational culture and norms that have stretched
traditional evidentiary standards for approval. For drugs
lacking confirmatory evidence of a clinical benefit - an
initial feature of most drugs approved under accelerated
approval or the fast-track program - additional post-
approval safeguards may be needed if these expedited
pathways are to remain among the available regulatory
options.
C. Quid Pro Quo: User Fees and FDA Performance Goals
Discussions of coziness between the FDA and the
pharmaceutical industry often "follow the money." Under
the authority of The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992
(PDUFA I),66 checks for substantial sums, representing
statutorily imposed user fees, must accompany marketing
applications submitted to the FDA by drug
manufacturers. 67 Drug user fees will pump $1.2 billion into
64. See Health Advisory, FDA, Suspended Marketing of Tysabri
(Natalizumab) (Mar. 3, 2005), available at, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug
advisory/natalizumab.htm.
65. See Press Release, FDA, FDA Statement on Iressa (Dec. 17, 2004).
Iressa was approved on the basis of data from small clinical trials without
placebo controls showing the drug had an effect on a surrogate endpoint-tumor
shrinkage. Id. In ten percent of patients, tumors decreased in size. Id. The post-
marketing study was done to investigate whether the drug actually prolonged
life. Id.
66. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. Law No. 102-571, 106 Stat.
4491 (1992) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379 (2005)).
67. See id; Establishment of Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal
Year 2005, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,165-68 (Aug. 2, 2004). Subsequently, user fee
schemes have been implemented for other sectors of FDA activity. A program of
user fees was implemented under The Mammography Quality Standards Act of
1992, 42 U.S.C. § 263b (2004), which provides for the inspection and
certification of mammography facilities. User fees for medical devices were
authorized on October 26, 2002 under The Medical Device User Fee and
Modernization Act of 2002, Pub. Law 107-250, 116 Stat. 1588. The Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act has been further amended by The Animal Drug
User Fee Act of 2003, Pub. Law 108-130, 117 Stat. 1361, to authorize the
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the agency over the five year period from 2002 to 2007.68
Some worry that what essentially amounts to payment for
FDA services has been accompanied by a commensurate
increase in the influence industry exerts on agency
procedures and policies and by a decline in the agency's
objectivity and independence.6 9
Authority for the imposition of user fees is found in
Title V of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of
1952,70 permitting a federal agency to charge for services it
provides when those services confer a special benefit on an
identifiable recipient. The United States is not unique in
shifting a portion of the cost of the drug approval process to
the regulated industry. The Medicine Control Agency in the
United Kingdom has levied user fees since the early 1980s,
and since April 1989 has derived all of its funding from this
source. 71 In January 1995, the European Parliament
approved regulations establishing the structure and
amount of fees to be paid by companies seeking marketing
authorization from the European Medicines Evaluation
Agency.72 The following year, Canada, through its Drug
Directorate, implemented a cost-recovery user fee plan.73
PDUFA I, signed into law by former President George
H. W. Bush on October 29, 1992, introduced a new dynamic
into the FDA process and signaled the start of an
unprecedented phase in the history of the FDA.74 The 1992
collection of user fees for certain animal drug applications, certain animal drug
products, manufacturing establishments, and investigational animal drug
submissions.
68. Steve Usdin, Middle Ground, BIOCENTURY, THE BERNSTEIN REPORT ON
BIOBUSINESS, Oct. 6, 2003, at A14.
69. See Avorn, supra note 2, at 374; see also Simon Frantz, Vioxx Fears
Prompt Call for User Fee Evaluation, Nature Reviews-Drug Discovery 4, 179
(2005), available at http://www.nature.com/nrd/journal/v4/n3/pdf/
nrd03O5analysis.pdf.
70. See Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952, 31 U.S.C. § 9701.
71. Sheila R. Shulman & Kenneth I. Kaitin, The Prescription Drug User Fee
Act of 1992: A 5-Year Experiment for Industry and the FDA, 9
PHARMACOECONOMICS 121, 122 (1996).
72. Id.
73. Therapeutic Products Directorate: TPD-Web, Health Canada, at
http://www.hc-sc.gc.cafhpfb-dgpsatpd-dpt/index-drugs-fees-e.html (last visited
Apr. 29, 2005).
74. Shulman, supra note 71, at 122.
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legislation authorized an initial five-year program of user
fees; Congress subsequently reauthorized the legislative
scheme in 1997 (PDUFA 11) 75 and 2002 (PDUFA IJ),76 for
additional five-year terms. Three categories of fees are
assessed: application, establishment, and product. The total
revenue to be collected for each of the three fee categories is
stipulated by statute; however, an annual adjustment is
made to account for inflation and workload based on the
estimated number of applications anticipated during the
relative fiscal period.77 Over the thirteen years since the
implementation of the program, user fee revenues have
increased by more than 700%. In Fiscal Year (FY) 1993,
prescription drug user fees generated $36 million; 78 the
anticipated revenue for 2005 totals $274,377,6079 and the
2006 FDA budget proposal estimates $382 million of its
$1.9 billion budget to come from the same user fee source. 80
The application fee, by far the most significant component
of the three categories of fees, has risen from $100,000 in
FY 1993 to $672,000 in 2005.81
A quid pro quo arrangement was key to the drug
companies buy-in on the user fee package. The result forced
a concentration of agency resources on faster drug reviews,
with no parallel increase in post-marketing oversight.8 2 In
1992, following lengthy negotiations between the FDA,
Congress, and the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries, an essential agreement was forged that
75. See The FDA Modernization Act of 1997.
76. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002).
77. See Establishment of Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year
2005, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,165 (Aug. 2, 2004).
78. See Establishment of Prescription Drug User Fee Revenues and Rates
for Fiscal Year 1994, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,184 (Dec. 13, 1993).
79. See Establishment of Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year
2005, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,165 (Aug. 2, 2004).
80. See Press Release, FDA, FDA Proposes $1.9 Billion Budget to Expand
Food Defense Effort, Increase Drug Safety and Medical Device Review, Pub. No.
P05-05 (Feb. 7, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2005/
NEW01155.html.
81. Id.
82. Avorn, supra note 2, at 93. See also, Editorial, Half a Step on Drug
Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2005, at A26.
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overcame industry's longstanding resistance to a user fee
program. Several factors were critical: first, the FDA
signaled a willingness to link user fees to a set of
performance goals that initially involved dedicating the
funds to improving the efficiency of the FDA review and
approval process and, among other things, hiring some six-
hundred new review staff; and second, the fees would be
added to existing FDA appropriations rather than replacing
them. The performance goals, which targeted issues of
longstanding concern to industry, including application
review times, backlogged overdue applications, and certain
organizational and management issues, were developed in
consultation with and received the endorsement of the
pharmaceutical industry.8 3 Each of the subsequent user fee
reauthorizations had its own set of quid pro quo FDA
performance targets. In 1997, the PDUFA II goals shifted
from the FDA review and approval phase to the clinical
development phase, implementing collaborative strategies
that included requirements for more formal dialogue and
written agreements between industry and FDA reviewers.
In 2002, PDUFA III goals continued to target FDA
review times for original and resubmitted applications.8 4
Other performance targets stipulate specific procedures and
timelines for meetings between FDA officials and company
representatives and for major dispute resolution. Two pilot
programs have been agreed to involving Fast Track drugs
or biologics.8 5 In one such project, the FDA may enter into
an agreement with the company sponsor to initiate a formal
program of frequent scientific feedback and interactions
regarding the development of the drug. This could take the
form of regular meetings between the FDA and company
83. User Fees for the Food and Drug Administration: Hearing on H.R. 5952
Before the House Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 102d Cong. 53 (1992)
(statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, President, 'Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association).
84. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ENCLOSURE: PDUFA REAUTHORIZATION
PERFORMANCE GOALS AND PROCEDURES, available at http://www.fda.gov/
oc/pdufa/PDUFALILGoals.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2005).
85. Section 506 of the FFDCA authorizes designation of drug or biologic as a
Fast Track product when it is intended to treat a serious or life-threatening
condition for which no effective therapeutic agent exists. FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. §
356 (2005).
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representatives, and regular written feedback on
development plans and clinical protocols.
The quid pro quo arrangement of user fees in exchange
for FDA commitments to speed the drug development and
review phases generally has been applauded. However,
some twelve years and two congressional reauthorizations
later, some might ask, applauded by whom? Certainly, the
agency has met its review commitments. In 2003, the
median time to market approval for priority-rated drugs
was 6.7 months compared to 14.9 months in 1993.86 For
standard-rated drugs, approval times fell from 27.2 months
in 1993 to 15.9 months in 2002.87 The months saved
translate into a longer effective patent life and increased
revenues for the sponsoring companies. Although the FDA
has hired hundreds of additional review staff and has been
applauded for its greater efficiency, the downside of the
review juggernaut may now be surfacing. Hints of a frenetic
atmosphere in which safety considerations may be
shortchanged were reported by the General Accounting
Office (GAO) in 2002.88 The GAO also reported a resource
shift away from other activities including post-marketing
surveillance.8 9 An aura in which the demands and needs of
industry as "the customer" threatens to cloud the agency's
work.90 In addition, the intersection of the fast-track and
user fee initiatives means that for priority-rated fast-track
drugs, the FDA review time must meet the abbreviated
user fee goal of six months. With a truncated development
86. FDA's Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research categorizes drugs to
be reviewed on the basis of therapeutic value. FDA, From Test Tube to Patient:
Improving Health Through Human Drugs (1999), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/whatwedo/testtube-full.pdf. Those allocated to
priority status offer significant therapeutic benefit over existing therapies;
those with a standard rating offer little or no therapeutic value over currently
available drugs. Id. at 31.
87. Okie, supra note 9, at 1065; Talk Paper, FDA, 2004 FDA
Accomplishments, Pub. No. T05-09 (Mar. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.fda.govfbbs/topics/ANSWERS/2005/ ANS01346.html.
88. See Report from the General Accounting Office to the Chairman,
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, U.S. Sen., GAO-02-958,
Food and Drug Administration: Effect of User Fees on Drug Approval Times,
Withdrawals, and other Agency Activities (Sept. 17, 2002).
89. See id.
90. See Okie, supra note 9, at 1064.
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period, less than certain outcome measures for efficacy,
diminished time for the emergence of safety issues, and
pressures to meet user fee performance goals, FDA
reviewers may be more vulnerable to and disadvantaged by
a greater than usual information deficit and by a
potentially bias-inducing collaborative investment with
industry.
D. "Innovation or Stagnation:" Critical Path Analysis9
An additional collaborative initiative involving the
FDA, industry, and academia was announced by the FDA in
March 2004. Termed "critical path" analysis, the new
partnership is a response to perceived roadblocks in the
product development process, manifest by a "slowdown" in
innovative new drug, biologic, and medical device
applications, or by what has been referred to as "sputtering"
biomedical innovation in the United States. 92 This dismal
outlook is attributed to three factors: the complexity of
novel drug development; the trend toward company
mergers resulting in the abandonment of some drug
development projects; and out-dated regulatory standards. 93
The FDA has highlighted a perceived disconnect between
the highly innovative work in the basic sciences and the
application of these new scientific principles to the
technology development process. 94 At issue is the relevance
and utility of traditional mechanisms of drug development,
which have changed little over the past decades, within the
context of emerging, novel fields such as gene therapy,
bioinformatics, the development of predictive biomarkers
and new vaccines. The goal here is the development of a
new "product development toolkit" to eliminate or reduce
the hazards that cause drugs to fail FDA standards, as well
as to stimulate innovation in the biomedical sciences. 95
91. See generally INNOVATION AND STAGNATION, supra note 61.
92. Id.; see also Usdin, supra note 68.
93. See Lester M. Crawford, Acting Commissioner of the FDA, Speech before
the Cleveland Clinic Foundation's 2004 Medical Innovation Summit, Oct. 20,
2004, available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/2004/cleveland1O20.html (last
visited April 15, 2005).
94. Id.
95. See INNOVATION OR STAGNATION, supra note 61, at 7, 9, 11, 13.
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This is not an entirely new role for the FDA, nor is it
inconsistent with the agency's mission to promote the
public health; it does, however, anticipate intense
information sharing among the agency, industry, and
academic partners to identify problematic points in the
"critical path," and to design adaptive tools. 96 It heightens
FDA's involvement in advancing innovation, and expands
its collaborative efforts to include the most fundamental
levels of drug development. The overlapping public health
interests of the key parties are obvious. However, for
industry, a successful outcome of the process suggests
considerable benefit in terms of time and R & D
investment. One study has estimated that the critical path
initiative may reduce drug development times from fifteen
years to five, saving nearly $500 billion in drug
development costs. 97
Regardless of the universally shared public health goals
of the critical path initiative, it is reasonable to anticipate
that the traditional complexities and nuances inherent in
regulator-industry collaborations will emerge here as well.
Information exchange will be central to achieving the
purposes of the program. The FDA will need industry
participants who are forthcoming with detailed and
accurate information to understand the nature and source
of development problems, and to craft effective rules and
policies in response. 98 The process would seem to call for a
level of transparency that could challenge industry
participation. As Coglianese and colleagues have pointed
out, the best source of information about the feasibility of
different technologies is the firms the agency regulates. 99
The potential exists for proprietary interests to infringe,
effectively hindering or reshaping the conversation to suit
the parameters established by the regulated firms.
96. See Raymond L. Woosley & Glenn Rice, A New System for Moving Drugs
to Market, 21 ISSUES IN SCI. AND TECH. 63, 65 (Winter 2005).
97. Robert Goldberg, The FDA and Drugmakers Should Think Small, USA
TODAY, Feb. 28, 2005, at A15.
98. Coglianese, supra note 34, at 278.
99. Id.
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E. Conflicts-of-Interest and FDA Advisory Boards
FDA's reliance on an agency-wide system of expert
advisory committees has been traced back to a precedent
established in 1908 with the appointment of the Referee
Board, made up of leading scientists of that era. 100 As the
volume and complexity of the agency's work have increased,
so too has its reliance on the advisory function of the
committees. 10' These scientific advisory panels, now an
integral part of the FDA process, are generally perceived as
broadening the agency's access to specific areas of expertise,
while at the same time enhancing the stature of the FDA's
decisions. 02 Currently, there are twenty-one scientific
advisory boards, organized according to specific therapeutic
categories, that may be convened by either the FDA's
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (sixteen)10 3 or the
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (five), 10 4 to
consider and make recommendations on a broad range of
issues related to drug development, safety, and approval.
In 1997, Congress removed FDA's discretion with
respect to the use, formation, and makeup of Advisory
Boards by mandating a role for the Committees, setting out
member qualifications and requirements for committee
diversity through the inclusion of consumer and industry
representation.10 5 The statute also addressed a seemingly
intransigent problem by requiring public disclosure of all
conflicts of interest members have with respect to the
specific questions assigned by the FDA, and mandating
100. See Peter B. Hutt, The Transformation of United States Food and Drug
Law, Address at the Centennial Meeting of the Association of Food and Drug
Officials (June 16, 1996).
101. Linda Ann Sherman, Looking Through a Window of the Food and Drug
Administration: FDA's Advisory Committee System, 2 PRECLINICA 99 (Mar./Apr.
2004).
102. Hutt, supra note 100, at 91.
103. See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/ acdrugs.html (last visited June 8, 2005).
104. See Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/acbiologics.html (last visited June 8, 2005).
105. See Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C.§ 355 (2005)). The statute also requires education and training of
committee members, and sets out a timeline for the FDA's response to Advisory
Board recommendations. Id.
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recusal in those instances where committee members or
their immediate families may gain financially as a result of
committee recommendations. 10 6
The conflicts problem may be attributable, in part, to
the experiential statutory requirements for panel
membership. Individuals must be "qualified by training and
experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness" of the
class of drugs to be considered by the committee, and
"possess skill and experience in the development,
manufacture, or utilization" of those drugs. 0 7  Not
surprisingly, many of those who meet these qualifications
have former or current ties to pharmaceutical firms as
consultants, expert witnesses, or clinical trial investigators,
or they hold stock in either the company whose product is
under consideration or in a competitor's company. 108 In a
2003 survey of advisory board members and individual
attendees at board meetings, eighty-eight percent agreed
that some conflict of interest among panel members was
unavoidable to ensure access to the best expertise in the
field. 109 FDA also has argued that the pool of individuals
from which to draw the requisite specialized knowledge is
unavoidably similar to that called upon by industry, leaving
little choice but to select those with dual roles. Others
disagree: "It defies credulity to suggest that this large
country does not contain enough highly qualified scientists
and clinicians to serve as totally independent arbiters of the
scientific questions posed to advisory panels." 110
Waiver of conflicts is an option under section 505(n)(4)
of the FDCA, and 18 U.S.C. § 208 (Acts Affecting a Personal
106. Id. (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (n)(4) (2005)).
107. Id. § 505(n)(3)(a).
108. See Elizabeth R. Glode, Advising Under the Influence?: Conflicts of
Interest Among FDA Advisory Committee Members, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 293,
294 (2002) (noting that a decrease in government funding for medical research
makes scientists more likely to rely on industry support).
109. Katherine A. McComas & Linda Ann Sherman, Conflicts of Interest
and FDA Advisory Committee Meetings, Summary Report, at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/acstudyO9O4/JIFSANresearch.html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2005).
110. Letter from Merrill Goozner, Center for Science in the Public Interest,
to Dr. Lester Crawford, Acting Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration,
(Mar. 10, 2005), at http://www.cspinet.org/new/200503101.htm].
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Financial Interest, applicable to all federal government
employees) when the expertise of the committee member is
deemed essential to the committee's deliberations.11 '
Waiver must be accompanied by disclosure of the conflict
when the committee deliberations are product specific. In a
Draft Guidance published in January 2002, FDA sets out a
new policy governing disclosure of the nature and
magnitude of a conflict of interest that has been waived
under those circumstances. 1 2
FDA's attempts to more effectively regulate the
conflicts issue continue to reveal shortcomings. Most
recently, twelve consumer groups, including the Center for
Science in the Public Interest, zeroed in on the conflict of
interest matter in correspondence to Dr. Lester Crawford,
Acting FDA Commissioner and the President's nominee to
assume the post permanently. The letter, dated March 10,
2005, requested closer scrutiny of FDA Advisory Committee
members and their links to companies whose products are
the subject of committee deliberations. 1 13  The letter,
111. Id. A waiver is expressly prohibited when a committee member's
scientific work is to be considered. The granting of a waiver must be
accompanied by public disclosure of the conflict. The extent of disclosure is the
subject of a Draft Guidance issued by the FDA in February, 2002. See U.S. FOOD
AND DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE ON DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST
FOR SPECIAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES PARTICIPATING IN FDA PRODUCT SPECIFIC
ADVISORY COMMITTEES, (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.fda.gov
oc/guidance/advisorycommittee.html.
112. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., supra note 111. Details of the nature
and magnitude of the conflict that has been waived are required to be disclosed
in the form of a declaration read into the record prior to the advisory committee
meeting. See id. The information disclosed should adequately enable a
reasonable person to understand the nature of the conflict and the degree to
which it could be expected to influence the recommendations the panel
members will make. See id.
113. See Letter from Merrill Goozner to Dr. Lester Crawford, supra note
110. The letter proposed six specific measures to restore "fairness and
credibility" to Advisory Committee deliberations including: prohibiting
members with relevant conflicts of interest from serving as panel members and
end the practice of granting waivers that permit conflicted members to serve;
barring from committee meetings any doctors or researchers who have a direct
financial relationship to companies that would be affected by the committee's
recommendations; increasing transparency by posting biographies of proposed
panel members thirty days prior to a meeting, rather than the seventy-two
hours prior, which is the current practice; allowing public comment on proposed
members; and posting the final roster and questions to be considered by the
panel on the FDA website at least seventy-two hours before the start of the
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requesting immediate reform of the committee process,
targeted the longstanding issue of conflicts of interest that
result from intellectual investments, and from current or
past financial relationships with drug companies (or with
their competitors) that are affected by a Committee's
recommendations. 114 Six specific reforms were advocated,
including a proposal to "limit the number of panel members
with any industry ties to no more than half the committee"
to ensure balance and compliance with "the letter and
spirit" of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). 115
Among the mandates of the FACA is one that requires that
the advice and recommendations of advisory committees
reflect independent judgment, and are not "inappropriately
influenced by the appointing authority or any special
interest." 116
The letter was precipitated by a high profile three-day
Advisory Committee meeting convened to consider
questions related to safety issues and continued marketing
of several Cox-2 inhibitor drugs.117 Following the meeting,
the Center for Science in the Public Interest, in response to
a request from The New York Times, published an analysis
meeting. See id.
114. See id.
115. See Letter from Merrill Goozner to Dr. Lester Crawford, supra note
110; Federal Advisory Committee Act § 2, 5 U.S.C. App. 2 (2001). The FACA,
which governs all advisory committees established by the President, federal
agencies, or Congress, reflected increasing concern about the influence of
advisory committees on the regulatory process and the committees' lack of
accountability. See Federal Advisory Committee Act § 2(b)(4). The FACA, which
among other things, made the process more transparent by opening committee
meetings to the public, sets out standards and procedures for all committees,
requiring committee membership to be balanced in terms of views and
perspectives. Federal Advisory Committee Act § 5(b)(2). All records, minutes,
reports, and other documentation related to committee meetings must be
available for public inspection, subject to the exemptions of the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. See also, Glode, supra note 108, at 298.
116. Federal Advisory Committee Act § 5(b)(3).
117. The Arthritis Drugs Advisory Committee & Drug Safety and Risk
Management Advisory Committee (Feb. 16-18, 2005) (transcripts available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/cderO5.html#DrugSafetyRiskMgmt). The
Arthritis Drugs Advisory Committee and the Drug Safety and Risk
Management Advisory Committee met February 16th through the 18th of 2005.
See id.
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of panel members' industry affiliations. 118 Drawing on
disclosures in medical journals and other public documents,
the Center concluded that ten of the thirty-two panel
members had past financial ties to one of the three
companies (Merck, Pfizer, or Novartis) directly affected by
the panel's determinations. 1 9 A review of the votes taken at
the conclusion of the meeting showed that committee
members with financial ties to the companies were ten
times more likely to vote in favor of the companies than
were members without such ties. 20 At the start of the
meetings, FDA issued a blanket waiver of the conflicts,
sidestepping its usual procedure of announcing the names
of panel members with relevant conflicts, stating that the
work of the committees involved "issues of broad
applicability" with no product approval questions to be
determined.121
The obvious conflicts emerging from the dual roles of
panel members have plagued the FDA's advisory committee
process for years. 22 In 1978, the U.S. Department of Justice
issued a restrictive interpretation of federal conflict of
interest laws that would have disqualified advisory
committee members in any matter in which they or their
institutions had received research support from a company
with an interest in that matter, even if the research support
was wholly unrelated. 23 In a 1992 report, prepared at the
request of the FDA, the Institute of Medicine addressed
118. See Press Release, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Conflicts of
Interest of Interest on COX-2 Panel: Research from CSPI's Integrity in Science
Project (Feb. 25, 2005) available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/
200502251.html.
119. See id.
120. Gardiner Harris & Alex Berenson, 10 Voters on Panel Backing Pain
Pills Had Industry Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005, at Al.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, USE OF ADVISORY COMMITTEES BY
THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, H.R. REP. No. 94-787 (1976).
123. See Peter Barton Hutt, Investigations and Reports Respecting FDA
Regulation of New Drugs (Part II), 33 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 674, 678 (1983); Correspondence from Attorney General John
Harmon to FDA Chief Counsel Richard Cooper (June 29, 1978); RICHARD A.
MERRILL, UNIV. OF ROCHESTER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV. (NOW THE
TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEv.), PROBLEMS INVOLVING FEDERAL
CONFLICT OF INTEREST RESTRICTIONS ON MEMBERS OF FDA ADVISORY
COMMITTEES AND AGENCY OFFICIALS, PS 8032 (1980).
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issues of conflict of interest, waivers, and intellectual bias.
The report called for improved education on conflict issues
for committee members and FDA staff, and for the
development of criteria and procedures to identify potential
bias, to protect objectivity and impartiality. 124 The FDA
responded through the publication of several Guidance
Documents addressing conflict of interest issues, 125 the
granting of waivers, and the extent of public disclosure that
must accompany a waiver.1 26
The decision not to disclose the conflicts-of-interest of
the Advisory Committee members prior to the February
2005 meeting highlights the continuing dilemma. A
reexamination of the agency's conflict-of-interest policies
seems timely. The European Medicines Evaluation Agency
(EMEA) recently revised its policy in this area as part of an
effort to achieve a more robust and transparent system. 27
The policy includes criteria to assess what is referred to as
a "risk level" associated with a given conflict. 128 The risk
level, assessed from one through three, is then used to
determine the extent of the expert's participation in
committee activities. 29 A risk level of three will result in
the exclusion of the expert from committee deliberations
124. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE USE OF ADVISORY
COMMITTEES BY THE FDA, FDA, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION ADVISORY COMMITTEES (1992).
125. See FDA, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FDA GUIDANCE ON
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS, CONSULTANTS AND
EXPERTS (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/conflictof-
interest/guidance.html.
126. See Draft Guidance on Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest for Special
Government Employees Participating in FDA Product Specific Advisory
Committees, 67 Fed. Reg. 6545 (Feb. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/guidance/advisorycommittee.html.
127. See EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY, EMEA POLICY ON THE HANDLING OF
CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS FOR EMEA SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEES MEMBERS AND
EXPERTS, DOC. REF. EMEAJH/31653/03/Final (2004) (hereinafter "EMEA
POLICY"), available at http://www.emea.eu.int/pdfs/general/direct/conflicts/
PolicyHandlingofConflictsoflnterests.pdf.
128. See id. at 2. Some of the criteria used to determine the risk level are
the following: background of the expert; nature of the declared interest;
availability of alternate experts; nature of the input needed from the expert;
and the role of the expert or the phase during which involvement is required.
See id. at 3.
129. Id.
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other than in those instances when no suitable alternative
expert can be found.1 30 In such a case, a waiver may be
granted, and the expert's risk level will be considered to be
at level two, thus circumscribing the expert's involvement.
Perhaps more interesting is the degree of public access to
information about committee members' conflicts-of-interest.
A list of experts is published on the EMEA's homepage
together with all Declarations of Interest submitted by
chairpersons and members of EMEA Scientific
Committees. 131 Although the Declarations have always
been available on request and in person, posting the
statements on the Internet for public scrutiny in advance of
committee deliberations not only expands transparency and
accessibility, but also serves to inject a measure of good
faith and accountability supportive of a more objective
process.
Part II
A. NIH Scientists and Collaboration with Industry
The NIH is the federal government's primary means for
conducting and funding medical and behavioral research.
The scientists and administrators within its twenty-seven
institutes and centers have a broad range of responsibilities
including: prioritizing funding for research, conducting
basic (preclinical) research on disease mechanisms and
potential therapeutic agents, designing clinical trials in
which therapeutic agents are tested in humans, and
assimilating results from clinical trials into treatment
recommendations. 132 Fellow scientists, regulators, and
ultimately the public depend on the NIH and its scientists
to conduct their work with scientific objectivity and the
130. See EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY, EMEA PROCEDURE ON THE HANDLING
OF CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS FOR EMEA SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND
EXPERTS, DOC. REF. EMEA/H/5475/04/Final 7-9 (2004), available at
http://www.emea.eu.int/pdfs/generalldirectconflicts/ProcedureHandlingofConfli
ctsoflnterest.pdf.
131. See EMEA POLICY, supra note 127, at 2.
132. See, e.g., About NIH, at http://www.nih.gov/about/ (last visited Apr. 30,
2005). NIH's mission statement lists the four goals of NIH including, "exemplify
and promote the highest level of scientific integrity, public accountability, and
social responsibility in the conduct of science." Id.
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highest professional standards so that the results can be
trusted as valid and reliable.
Unlike the FDA, the NIH is not a regulatory agency.
Yet, it is recognized that NIH scientists are influential
because of their role in directing extramural research (NIH-
funded grants for research typically at academic medical
centers and universities) and developing practice guidelines
(e.g., treatment criteria and methods for specific
diseases). 133 Outside of their official duties, many NIH
scientists are influential because of their contributions to
the field and, to a lesser extent, the agency they
represent. 134 It is not surprising, therefore, that the
expertise of these scientists is in demand by the
pharmaceutical industry, advising regarding nascent
technology, designing clinical trials, and sitting on boards of
startup biotechnology companies. 135 The pharmaceutical
industry has much to offer in return, particularly in
providing significant capital for pre-clinical research and
bringing novel technologies to market, and the opportunity
for scientists on government pay scales to earn additional
pay through consulting. 136
Collaboration among industry, government, and
scientists (NIH as well as scientists in academic medical
centers, as discussed later) was not permitted under
existing patent laws. The Federal Technology Transfer Act
of 1986137 ("Technology Transfer Act"), and the Bayh-Dole
Patent and Trademark Amendments of 1980138 ("Bayh-Dole
133. See Steinbrook, Financial Conflicts of Interest and the NIH, 350 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 327, 328 (2004).
134. See Hamilton Moses III et al., Collaborating with Industry-Choices for
the Academic Medical Center, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1371 (2002). Biotechnology
firms find it easier to attract venture capital investors to projects affiliated with
scientists, such as those with NIH affiliation. See id. at 1372.
135. Their expertise is also more highly compensated by the pharmaceutical
industry, as NIH scientists with a current salary cap of $200,000 earn in salary
as little as one-third of their counterparts in the private sector. See Steinbrook,
supra note 133, at 328.
136. See id. at 330.
137. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat.
1785 (1986).
138. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 201 (a)-(i) (1982)).
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Act") are credited with harnessing market forces to drive
innovations in biotechnology and drug development, among
other sciences. 139 The Bayh-Dole Act modified patent law to
permit inventions developed using federal funding to be
held by the organization responsible for the development. 140
The organization (whether the NIH or an academic medical
center) could grant exclusive licenses to the technology,
provided that the scientist directly responsible for the
discovery received a minimum of fifteen percent of the
royalties. 141 Prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, the federal
government owned the rights to inventions developed with
federal funds. 42 Any discoveries by government scientists
or by university-based scientists using federal funding
belonged to the government. The government's patent
rights were not easily assigned (e.g., to the university that
made discovery) and federal licensing of the technology was
done on a nonexclusive basis, consistent with the
philosophy that research findings should be shared widely
with the scientific community.1 43
139. See Jennifer A. Henderson and John J. Smith, Financial Conflicts of
Interest in Medical Research: Overview and Analysis of Federal and State
Controls, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 445 (2002). Though the Bayh.Dole Act applies to
all government agencies, it is the National Academy of Sciences and the
National Institutes of Health that have yielded the vast majority of
collaborative efforts. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: ADMINISTRATION OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT BY RESEARCH
UNIVERSITIES 5 (1998), available at www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98126.pdf.
140. See An Act to Amend the Patent and Trademark Laws, Pub. L. No. 96-
517 § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (Dec. 12, 1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1994)).
141. See 37 C.F.R. § 401.14 (2004). Under the Technology Transfer Act, the
minimum royalties that can be assigned to an NIH scientist are fifteen percent.
15 U.S.C. § 3710c(a)(1)(A)(i) (2005). The average royalty assigned to academic
medical center researchers under the Bayh-Dole Act is between thirty and fifty
percent. Eric G. Campbell et al., Inside the Triple Helix: Technology Transfer
and Commercialization in the Life Sciences, 23 HEALTH AFF. 64, 71 (2004).
142. Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr., Public-Private Partnerships in Biomedical
Research: Resolving Conflicts of Interest Arising Under the Federal Technology
Transfer Act of 1986, 4 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 5 (1989/1990). Prior to the Bayh-Dole
Act, the most that a licensor of federal technology could obtain was a non-
exclusive license, of much less commercial value.
143. See Trudo Lemmens, Leopards in the Temple: Restoring Scientific
Integrity to the Commercialized Research Scene, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 641, 644
(2004).
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Under the Bayh-Dole Act, scientists from the NIH or
from universities are authorized, even encouraged, to
protect rather than share new technology and to partner
with industry to exploit the commercial value of discoveries,
and "become part-time entrepreneurs."' 144 The Bayh-Dole
Act has been criticized as leading to hoarding of
information by scientists either because of contractual
restrictions or from the drive to ensure maximum
commercial benefit.145  Nevertheless, the increase in
productivity in biomedicine has been noted during the years
since its passage, and many credit these market incentives
for the increase. 146
The Federal Technology Transfer Act was built on
previous legislation, particularly the Bayh-Dole Act, to
authorize federal scientists, such as those at the NIH, to
collaborate with industry so that technology from
government owned and operated laboratories can be
commercialized. 147 Specifically, federal employees may
participate in Commercial Research and Development
Agreements (CRADAs) in which private companies finance
research within government laboratories in exchange for
patent rights on developments. 148 The Technology Transfer
Act specifies that there can be no conflicts of interests
under CRADAs, so scientists with financial interests or
consulting arrangements with specific private companies
must divest of these before participating in CRADAs with
those companies. 149
144. Id.
145. See David Blumenthal, Academic-Industrial Relationships in the Life
Sciences, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2452, 2455 (2003).
146. See id. at 2454 (noting data from the 1990s showing that private-
academic partnerships are more efficient at technology transfer than traditional
scientific publications and meetings, among other indicators of productivity).
147. See Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub L. No. 99-502, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 100 Stat. 1785 (1986) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701 et seq.).
Specifically, the applicable sections provide, "Technology transfer, consistent
with mission responsibilities, is a responsibility of each laboratory scientist,"
requiring that laboratory directors consider technology transfer efforts in job
performance reviews for the scientists in the laboratories. 15 U.S.C. §
3710(a)(2), (3). See also Bulleit, supra note 142, at 7.
148. See id.
149. See Steinbrook, supra note 133, at 328. The NIH currently has about
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More recently, NIH scientists were allowed to expand to
consulting and directing biomedical firms (other than
companies with which they participated in CRADAs), and
to receive payment in money as well as stock or stock
options for their consulting work. 150 Prior to 1995, NIH's
policies regarding outside activities were more restrictive
than those of other executive agencies. In 1995, the Director
of NIH, Dr. Harold Varmus, relaxed the NIH conflicts
policies to be consistent with then existing policies by the
Office of Government Ethics (OGE). 151 The goal in relaxing
NIH conflicts of interest policies at that time was to
improve scientist recruitment and retention, recognizing
that NIH competes with private industry for skilled
scientists.152
The 1995 changes in NIH conflicts policies affected all
staff with the exception of presidential appointees. Institute
and center directors had been limited in the types of outside
activities they could perform; these restrictions were
removed. All employees had been limited to outside
earnings of $25,000 from a single source and $50,000 from
all sources combined; these limits were removed. After
1995, employees could accept payment in the form of stock
275 such agreements. Id.
150. See ETHICS OFFICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, NIH POLICY
MANUAL, OUTSIDE WORK AND RELATED ACTIVITIES WITH OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS,
NIH MANUAL No. 2300-735-4 (Feb. 17, 1998), available at
http://ethics.od.nih.gov/chapters/735-4/735-4.pdf
151. See NIH Ethics Concerns: Consulting Arrangements and Outside
Awards: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations,
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of
Harold Varmus, Former Director, NIH) available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/l5182004hearingl275/
Varmus2007.htm. See also Steinbrook, supra note 133, at 329. Since 1992, the
Office of Government Ethics (OGE) has provided conflicts of interest and
financial disclosure guidelines for agencies of the executive branch. See NIH
Ethics Concerns: Consulting Arrangements and Outside Awards: Hearing Before
the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Marilyn Glynn, Acting
Director, U.S. Office of Government Ethics) at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/05182004Hearingl275/Glynn2O
03.htm. Each agency head appoints a Designated Agency Ethics Official
(DAEO) to manage that agency's ethics program, including approval of outside
activities. Id. The DAEO appoints Deputy Ethics Counselors (DECs) chosen by
each operating division, such as the FDA or the NIH. See id.
152. See Steinbrook, supra note 133, at 329.
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or stock options as well as money, and laboratory employees
could work for an outside organization, as long as they did
not have direct official business with the organization. 153
All of these policy changes were done with the oversight
and approval of the OGE, and were consistent with policies
applied to other executive agencies. The resulting increased
collaboration among NIH scientists and industry has been
credited for new drugs, such as Videx, a Bristol-Myers
Squibb drug used to treat Human Immunodeficiency Virus
infections, and Fludara, a Berlex drug used to treat chronic
lymphocytic leukemia. 154 Increased collaboration between
industry and NIH scientists is also credited with improving
recruitment and retention of NIH scientists, because of both
the atmosphere of innovation and the potential for income
outside the government pay scale.
B. Role Overlap and Conflicts of Interests
The legislative initiatives and changes in NIH's conflict
of interest policy resulting in commercialization of what had
previously been public domain, together with market forces
favoring development of new technologies, has been
credited with creating "a cozy space for interaction between
industry and other "stakeholders."'155 The implication is
that as industry and NIH and academic scientists become
more cozy, the rest of us should feel less comfortable
because scientists' judgment may be compromised and their
institutions can lose their public health mission when there
are profits to be had from biomedical development.
Specific areas of concern include: giving one drug
company unfair competitive advantage over another, failing
to report complete data, exposing human subjects to
153. See id. at 327-29.
154. See Avoiding Conflicts of Interest at NIH: Hearing Before the S.
Subcomm. on Labor, Health, and Human Servs., Educ. and Related Agencies, S.
Comm. on Appropriations, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Harold Varmus,
President, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center) at
http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/record.cfm ?id=217285.
155. Lemmens, supra note 143, at 645. Lemmens aptly notes that by
harnessing market forces, federally funded research focuses less on cost-
effective public health measures and more on patentable products. See id.
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unacceptable hazards, and inaccurate interpretation and
reporting of results of clinical trials.156
Indeed, many regard as intuitive the notion that
financial relationships with pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies unduly influence professional
judgment of researchers, whether the researchers intend it
or not.157 What has become clear at the highest levels of the
NIH, however, is that "coziness," even if scientifically
defensible, undermines the perception of the validity of the
protocols, research, and recommended standards developed
by NIH scientists.
Public perception of the relationship of NIH scientists
with pharmaceutical companies was sensitized by various
Los Angeles Times articles, casting the overlapping roles of
scientist, consultant, and entrepreneur in a different
light. 158 The series highlighted several instances in which
the objectivity of NIH scientists could be questioned,
casting doubt on the validity of assessments about certain
therapies as well as the safety of patients participating in
clinical trials.159 One of the most prominent examples given
was that of H. Bryan Brewer Jr., a scientist at the National
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) within NIH. 160
Dr. Brewer reportedly consulted four manufacturers of a
class of cholesterol-lowering drugs, statins, earning
$114,000 from 2001 to 2003.161 During this period, Dr.
Brewer contributed in his official NIH capacity to patient
treatment guidelines that made statins the standard of
care, and in May 2001, urged more aggressive treatment
156. Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest,
329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 573-76 (1993).
157. See id.
158. See David Willman, The National Institutes of Health: Public Servant
or Private Marketer? L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2004, at Al; Willman has continued to
examine the role of NIH scientists through his articles, which have included
coverage of the supplemental conflicts of interest rule. See, e.g., David Willman,
Drug Companies and Government Medical Research, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003,
at Al; David Willman, Drug Maker Hired NIH Researcher, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7,
1998, at Al.
159. See David Willman, Case Study-Dr. Lance A. Liotta and Emanuel F
'Chip' Petricon III, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2004, at A28; David Willman, Case
Study-Dr. Trey Sunderland III, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2004, at A26.
160. See id.
161. See id.
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with statins. 162 Dr. Brewer also authored a 2003 publication
in which he interpreted data as showing that the benefits of
Crestor (a statin) outweighed its risks. 163 This publication
in the American Journal of Cardiology did not mention his
financial relationship with the drug's manufacturer,
AstraZeneca, but did identify Dr. Brewer as an NIH
employee. 164 Since that time, the drug's safety has been
questioned, and a similar statin with related risks has been
pulled from the market.165 The Los Angeles Times series
included several other examples of consulting fees and stock
options among NIH scientists, several of which have been
disputed by the NIH scientists mentioned in the series. 166
An OGE investigation of 100 NIH scientists for
improprieties alleged in the Los Angeles Times series and
elsewhere found that as many as 80% of the scientists
investigated had done nothing wrong.167
Following the Los Angeles Times series, U.S. Senate
and House of Representatives subcommittees held oversight
hearings on conflicts of interest within NIH.16s Members of
162. See id. See also NATIONAL HEART, LUNG, AND BLOOD INSTITUTE,
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, THIRD REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CHOLESTEROL
EDUCATION PROGRAM (NCEP) EXPERT PANEL ON DETECTION, EVALUATION, AND
TREATMENT OF HIGH BLOOD CHOLESTEROL IN ADULTS, available at
www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/cholesterol/ atp3xsum.pdf.
163. H. Bryan Brewer, Benefit-risk Assessment of Rosuvastatin 10 to 40
Milligrams, 92 (4B) AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 23K-29K (2003). Note that rosuvastatin
is the generic name for Crestor. See id. at 23K.
164. See id.
165. Bayer Pharmaceutical Division voluntarily withdrew Baycol
(cerivastatin) from the U.S. market following reports of severe muscle reactions
to this drug. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA, BAYCOL
INFORMATION, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/ infopage/baycol/default.htm (last
visited Apr. 30, 2005).
166. See, e.g., Avoiding Conflicts of Interest at NIH: Hearing Before the S.
Appropriations Subcomm. on Labor, HHS, and Education, 109th Cong. (2004)
(statement of Stephen I. Katz, Director, National Institute of Arthritis and
Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases), available at http://appropriations.senate.
gov/hearmarkups/record.cfm?id=217283.
167. See Rick Weiss, NIH Clears Most Researchers in Conflict-of-Interest
Probe, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2005, at A01.
168. For an excellent resource about these House and Senate hearings, see
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
CONFLICT OF INTEREST INFO. AND RESOURCES, at http://www.nih.gov/about/
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Congress disparaged the practice of permitting senior NIH
scientists to consult with industry and generally
recommended that senior NIH officials and scientists be
prohibited from working with industry while employed by
NIH. 169 Though current NIH Director, Elias Zerhouni,
denied that there is any evidence that patients were
harmed because of any scientist's relationship with
industry, he stated that he had "reached the conclusion that
drastic changes are needed" to protect the public trust and
the integrity of NIH and its scientists.170
During this period, Dr. Zerhouni had requested that an
independent Blue Ribbon Panel study the issue and
recommend appropriate policy changes. 171 The Blue Ribbon
Panel adopted as its single guiding principle:
"NIH employees must avoid conflicts of interest incompatible with
the proper exercise of their authority and the proper performance
of their duties. Employees in a position to influence the financial
interests of an outside entity such as a current or possible future
recipient of an NIH grant or contract should neither receive
ethicsCOI.htm (last reviewed Mar. 31, 2005).
169. See NIH Ethics Concerns: Consulting Arrangements and Outside
Awards: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations,
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 1-6 (2004) (opening
statement of James Greenwood, Chair, House of Representatives), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congresslhouse/ house05chl08.html. Rep. Greenwood
referred to NIH scientists' consulting arrangement while still employed at NIH
as a form of "honest graft," which he termed the "swivel chair." See id. at 1. The
"swivel chair" contrasts with the idea of a "revolving door" in which government
employees leave government service to work for the private sector in related
areas, as when Rep. Greenwood left Congress in July 2004 to head the
Biotechnology Industry Organization. See Ted Agres, NIH Critic to Quit
Congress, THE SCIENTIST, July 23, 2004, available at http://www.the-
scientist.com/news/20040723/03.
170. NIH Ethics Concerns: Consulting Arrangements and Outside Awards:
Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2004), (statement of Elias
Zerhouni, Director, National Institutes of Health, DHHS) (hereinafter
"Zerhouni") at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/
06222004hearing 1312/Zerhouni2076.htm.
171. See Avoiding Conflicts of Interest at NIH: Hearing Before the S.
Appropriations Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Serv. and Educ., 108th
Cong. (2004) (statement of Elias Zerhouni, Dir., NIH), available at
http://olpa~od.nih.gov/hearings/108/session2/ testimonies/conflictl.asp.
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financial benefits from that organization nor have significant
financial interests in it."172
Though relatively few NIH employees (approximately
120 of 17,500) had outside consulting agreements with
biomedical companies at the time of the investigation, there
were also honoraria and awards received from industry that
were not considered outside employment and had not been
reported. 173 The Panel noted the tension caused when NIH
scientists are encouraged to pursue individual financial
interests at the same time as public scientific interests, and
its recommendations reflected the desire to improve morale
at NIH and ensure the public's trust in and support of the
work of NIH. 174
After the Panel issued its report, the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS), with the concurrence
of the OGE, issued supplemental ethics regulations for NIH
scientists, adopting most of the recommendations. 175 The
interim final regulation became effective on publication on
February 3, 2005.176 The threat to the integrity and public
esteem of NIH posed by outside employment or financial
relationships with biotechnology or pharmaceutical
companies was, therefore, sufficient to prompt a ban on
most outside employment, divestiture of equity assets by
many scientists and other restrictions, though less drastic
approaches had been under consideration. 177 The rule,
172. NAT'L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF
HEALTH BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICIES 1-2 (2004)
(hereinafter "Blue Ribbon Panel"), available at www.nih.gov/about/
ethicsCOI_panelreport.pdf.
173. See id. Inconsistent enforcement of existing reporting rules was also
noted by the U.S. Office of Government Ethics finding that 40% of the 155
outside payments to NIH employees it sampled randomly had not been
approved in advance or accounted for within the agency. See id.
174. See id. at 11-12.
175. See id. at 19.
176. See Supplemental Standards of Ethical Conduct and Financial
Disclosure Requirements for Employees of the Department of Health and
Human Services, 70 Fed. Reg. 5543, 5558-65 (Feb. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 5
C.F.R. pts. 5501-02) (hereinafter "Supplemental Standards").
177. In his June 22, 2004 testimony before the U.S. House of
Representatives Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee
on Energy and Commerce, Dr. Zerhouni stated that he planned to prohibit the
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effective on publication, represents a significant shift in the
acceptability of overlapping roles of NIH employees,
particularly the scientists.
C. NIH's New Supplemental Regulations for Conflicts of
Interest
The regulations (to be codified at 5 CFR 5501 et seq.)
apply, to one degree or another, to all 17,500 NIH
employees and focus on three areas in particular: activities
(work, speeches, writing) outside NIH; financial holdings in
biomedical companies; and awards. 178 All NIH employees
are prohibited from outside employment with "substantially
affected organizations," broadly defined as including
biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and medical device
companies. 179 Employment with other organizations (e.g.,
teaching at a university; providing medical care in a
separate practice) using the expertise of the NIH scientist
must be approved in advance, consistent with NIH policy
prior to the supplemental regulations and other regulations
on outside employment. 8 0  Writing in professional
publications and speaking at continuing education
seminars is still permitted (with advance approval), even if
wholly or partly funded by pharmaceutical or biotechnology
companies, as long as funding is unrestricted (i.e., not
contingent on inclusion of specific content or speakers) and
there is no editorial control by the funding company.' 8'
Restrictions on investments in substantially affected
companies vary with the type of disclosure required of the
NIH employee: "confidential" filers (approximately 25,000
employees, based on pay levels) and "public" filers
most senior scientists from consulting with pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies, but permit other NIH employees to do so, provided there were
controls in place. Zerhouini, supra note 171, at 4.
178. See Supplemental Standards, supra note 176, at 5558. NIH employees
were informed of the recommendations of the NIH Blue Ribbon Committee as of
July 2004, with the knowledge that the supplemental regulations would be
drawn from the Committee's report.
179. 5 C.F.R. § 5501.109(b)(8)(i) (2005).
180. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2635.603(a) (2005) (prohibiting work outside the
NIH that is the same as official duties and work for an organization that has
business with the agency in which the employee participates).
181. 5 C.F.R. §§ 5501.109(b)(10)-(11) (2005).
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(approximately 1,000 employees at the highest levels within
NIH).182 All NIH employees filing either of these financial
disclosure reports, as well as their spouses and minor
children, must divest of stocks in any companies involved in
research, development, or manufacture of medical devices,
biotechnology or pharmaceuticals.18 3 Even the majority of
NIH employees who are not required to file such disclosure
reports are limited to a total of $15,000 in any one company
held by the NIH employee, spouse, and minor children
combined.' 8 4 There are certain exceptions, such as stocks
held in mutual funds or in employment retirement vehicles
established prior to NIH employment. 8 5 The divestiture
requirement, similar to that required of FDA employees,
was implemented by DHHS to avoid the appearance that
industry holdings could affect the scientific judgment of its
most influential scientists. 8 6 This requirement may appear
overbroad, requiring divestiture even if the senior NIH
employee has no official business related to the specific
company. It is, however, a reflection of the nature of the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry when today's
startup is tomorrow's subsidiary of a parent company with
numerous spin-off companies.
Finally, senior employees are prohibited from accepting
most awards of more than $200 from any entity that has
business with NIH, or seeks official action from NIH. 8 7 The
182. NIH Ethics Concerns: Consulting Arrangements and Outside Awards:
Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Edgar M.
Swindell, Associate General Counsel, Ethics Division, DHHS), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/O6222004hearingl312/
Swindell2004.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
183. See DHHS Prohibited Financial Interests, 5 C.F.R. § 501.110(c) (2005).
184. See id. § 5501.110(d)(i). De minimis levels may be adjusted, and are
cross-referenced to the level set for all executive branch employees. See id.
§2640.202(a).
185. See 5 C.F.R. § 5501.110(e).
186. Comments accompanying the regulation state that DHHS "has
determined that the acquisition or holding of these financial interests would
cause a reasonable person to question the impartiality or objectivity with which
NIH programs are administered." Supplemental Standards, supra note 176, at
5543-57 (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 5501).
187. See 5 C.F.R. § 5501.111(b) (2005). Senior employees include the
Director, Deputy Director of the NIH, the Directors (Scientific and Clinical) of
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regulations do not change requirements for non-senior
employees, also limited to $200 aggregate award unless it is
a bona fide meritorious award. 8 8 Awards are reviewed in
advance by an independent NIH advisory committee to the
Director, and it is up to the Director or the Secretary of
DHHS to grant the exception. 8 9 For permitted awards, a
cooling-off period of one year following the award
disqualifies the NIH employee from participating in official
matters relating to donor organization. 190
The supplemental regulations avoid running counter to
existing statutes, including the Technology Transfer Act. 191
NIH employees are prohibited from engaging in the sale or
promotion of products of biomedical companies, except
when that employee owns the patent to the product. 192 The
regulations do not affect the potential for employees to earn
royalties on their inventions, either through direct licensing
or through CRADAs; however, as before, the NIH employee
may not be involved in negotiating a CRADA with a
biomedical company if the employee has an existing
financial relationship with that company.
The mechanism for employee reporting and Institute
enforcement remains the same as before the supplemental
regulation and is the same for all federal employees. The
increased reporting is not without costs, however, as the
OGE personnel devoted to DHHS has already increased
from eleven to twenty-five to accommodate demand for
disclosure review. 193 Of course, each employee retains
ultimate responsibility for compliance with the
each of the Institutes and Centers that comprise NIH, and Extramural Program
Officials. Id. § 5501.111(b)(1)(ii). Exceptions are made for high and widely
recognized awards in the fields of medicine and science such as the Nobel Prize
and others on a case -by case basis. Id. § 5501.111(c).
188. See Supplemental Standards, supra note 176, at 5552.
189. See id. at 5553-54.
190. See 5 C.F.R. § 5501.112.
191. See Supplemental Standards, supra note 176, at 5547. As previously,
any invention developed while in the employment of NIH is assigned to NIH
unless the NIH waives its patent rights, in which case the employee may elect
to pursue the patent and hold all rights to the invention. See id.
192. 5 C.F.R. § 5501.109(c)(1)(iii).
193. See Swindell, supra note 182.
702 [Vol. 53
DRUG DEVELOPMENT
supplementary regulations and with other rules applicable
to all federal employees. 194
The question remains, however, whether a ban on
equity holdings and consulting arrangements for higher-
level scientists and officials is desirable. A ban has the
virtue of being clearer than previous policies, and,
therefore, easier to enforce. Greater clarity is achieved both
by defining "substantially affected organizations" and by
linking reporting requirements and investment/honoraria
restrictions to existing financial disclosure levels. 195 Initial
reactions have varied, but some feel that these measures,
though more strict than necessary to avoid conflicts, were
needed to rebuild the public's trust in the NIH.196 It is
worthwhile to note, however, that Dr. Zerhouni is already
seeking changes in the rules, prompted in part by
opposition by NIH personnel in the stock divestiture
requirements. 197
Yet a ban is probably the least likely means to achieve
the goal of promoting trustworthiness in human subjects
research. 198 Robert Gatter argues persuasively that a ban
on specific financial relationships promotes an inaccurate
message among scientists that others are acting out of self-
interest, and results in lower compliance with report and
conflicts avoidance goals. 99 Gatter states that it is
194. See 5 C.F.R. § 5501.104(a) (2005).
195. See 5 C.F.R. § 5501.109(b)(8) (2005).
196. See generally Robert Gatter, Walking the Talk of Trust in Human
Subject Research, 52 EMORY L.J. 327 (2003) (recommending an approach similar
to that suggested by DHHS). Gattner describes the benefits of creating "a
general standard of fidelity" (disclosures) with a "risk of liability" for conduct
deviating from the acceptable collaboration, rather than a general ban which
invites individuals to find ways around it. Id. at 397-98.
197. See Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, NIH Diretor Zerhouni Says He
Will Seek Changes in New Conflict-of-Interest Rules (Apr. 7, 2005), at
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports/print-report.cfm?DR_ID=29197&dr
_cat=3.
198. See generally Gatter, supra note 196 (recommending an approach
similar to that suggested by DHHS). Gatter describes the benefits of creating "a
general standard of fidelity" (disclosures) with a "risk of liability" for conduct
deviating from the acceptable collaboration, rather than a general ban which
invites individuals to find ways around it. Id. at 397-98.
199. See id. at 390-91.
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preferable to clarify expected norms, for example,
promoting a general message that scientists or officials
should not conduct human subjects research or take official
action if they have significant financial interests at stake.200
Gatter's approach fits the situation at NIH, as there
were few NIH scientists who benefited from undisclosed
industry deals, and existing reporting mechanisms were
underused.2 l  The behavioral norm that should be
expressed is that stated by the Blue Ribbon Panel: avoiding
conflicts that interfere with official duties and benefiting
financially from the results of clinical research. Congress
has made it clear in its legislation related to technology
that productivity with integrity is the goal in biomedical
research, and the objective of the Bayh-Dole Act and related
legislation is to avoid conflicting interests, not interaction
with industry. To ensure that the NIH maximizes self-
regulatory behavior, Gatter's approach would avoid a broad
ban (which invites individuals to find ways around it) and
instead create a general standard of fidelity with disclosure
and institutional oversight. 202
The short-term and long-term impact of the
supplemental regulations will be assessed by DHHS over
the coming year, particularly with regard to scientist
recruitment and retention. 20 3  The results of this
assessment, along with public comments on the regulation,
will be used in developing the final regulation. 20 4
In addition to focusing on NIH personnel issues, it
would be useful for DHHS to consider the impact of
supplemental regulations on the public perception of NIH's
200. See id. at 368-69.
201. See Weiss, supra note 167.
202. Gatter, supra note 196, at 397-98.
203. Supplemental Standards, supra note 176, at 5543. The DHHS Office of
Inspector General is also investigating NIH enforcement of conflicts of interest
policies. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
DHHS/OIG WORK PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2005-PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCIES (2005),
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/public-ations/docs/workplan/2005/2005WPPHAs.
pdf. There is concern that limitations on additional earnings (especially for
scientists at the highest level of NIH where government salaries are least
competitive with private industry) may put NIH in a disadvantaged position for
recruiting and retaining scientists. See Robert Steinbrook, Conflicts of Interest
at the NIH-Resolving the Problem, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 955, 955-57 (2005).
204. Supplemental Standards, supra note 176, at 5543.
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scientific integrity. Though it could not be evaluated in the
short term of one year, it would also be useful to track
surrogate measures of productivity, such as CRADAs
established or patents generated. It would be much more
difficult to assess the impact of the regulations where the
impact matters most: on the validity of research and on the
safety of research subjects, just as it has been impossible to
assess the effect on these two areas of the relationships
between scientists and private biomedical entities. There is
nothing in the supplemental regulation or accompanying
discussion to suggest that the NIH approach should be
adopted by academic medical centers, however, it would be
informative to track the impact, if any, on the conflicts of
interest policies at academic medical centers.
D. Academic Medical Institutions-Collaboration and
Conflicts of Interests
Like government scientists, researchers at academic
medical centers have become more entrepreneurial,
accepting support form, and providing expertise to for-profit
entities developing pharmaceuticals, devices, and other
fruits of biomedical research. As discussed above, the Bayh-
Dole Act encouraged collaboration among researchers, their
academic institutions, and commercial entities to bring
promising innovations from the laboratory bench to
market.205 The primary mechanism for encouraging
collaboration is found in patenting and exclusive licensing
rights granted the inventor and the inventor's
institution. 206 Private sector biomedical firms have the
option of investing in promising research (paid in money,
stock, or stock options) in exchange for these patent and
licensing rights. In this way, private sector companies can
own the technology developed under federal funding at
academic medical centers. As a result, private sector
funding for academic-based research has increased
dramatically over the past twenty-five years. 207 The
205. See supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
206. See id.
207. See Blumenthal, supra note 145, at 2452, 2455 (2003).
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increase in private sector funding began at a time when
there was considerably less financial support for basic and
clinical from the federal government through NIH.208
As with government researchers, overlapping roles of
academic researchers have aroused concern, though many
stakeholders view a "principled partnership" between
academia and industry as essential in continuing medical
progress. 20 9 Among preclinical scientists (i.e., laboratory
scientists), the concern is that commercial interests may
reduce the scientific objectivity of researchers, either
intentionally or unintentionally. When researchers who are
also patient care providers have relationships with
industry, there are two areas of concern. As with preclinical
scientists, there is the potential for bias in study design and
result reporting, rendering results unreliable. 210 There is
also significant concern about the safety of patients and
healthy volunteers because of the risk that patient accrual
may be inappropriately zealous or that experimental drugs
are used in humans without sufficient safeguards. 211
Potential conflicts of interests may affect an individual
researcher, similar to the experience of NIH researchers, in
which an investigator has a financial tie to the sponsor of
the research, such as consulting agreements, or equity in
the company. Unlike federal research facilities, however,
academic institutions themselves may have vested interests
in research outcomes. Institutions may have direct financial
ties to commercial research sponsors. 212 More problematic,
however, are the conflicts that arise when the institution
develops (and, therefore, owns) the technology (shared with
the inventor as provided by the Bayh-Dole Act) and
208. See id.
209. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, PROTECTING SUBJECTS,
PRESERVING TRUST, PROMOTING PROGRESS: POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR THE
OVERSIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL FINANCIAL INTEREST IN HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 3
(2001), available at http://www.aamc.org/members/coitf/ firstreport.pdf.
210. Blumenthal, supra note 145.
211. See id.
212. Academic medical centers receive varied support from for-profit
biotechnology companies in addition to equity holdings. Examples include
financial support of graduate students or fellows, joint patents and licensing
with the academic medical center, and donations to affiliated universities. See
id. at 2452.
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conducts clinical testing of the therapy. 213The well-known
case of Jesse Gelsinger, an 18-year-old who died during the
course of experimental gene therapy at the University of
Pennsylvania, is an example of institutional conflicts of
interests. 214  The university and the co-investigator
conducting the earliest study of the drug in humans (Phase
I toxicity) held equity in the company that would
commercialize the therapy.21 5 Investigation following the
death of Mr. Gelsinger by the FDA focused on the
institution's failure to disclose adverse effects in earlier
primate experiments and in other patients.216  In
discussions that have followed, the case has been used as
an example of the potential for financial benefits to an
academic medical center and its researchers to overwhelm
ethical scientific and clinical judgment. 217
Just as with NIH investigators, academic researchers
and their institutions' financial interests in technology do
not necessarily result in compromised research or threats to
patient or human subject safety. Like the NIH, academic
213. Mark Barnes and Patrik S. Florencio, Investigator, IRB and
Institutional Financial Conflicts of Interest in Human-Subjects Research: Past,
Present and Future, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 525, 529-30 (2002).
214. Id. at 525.
215. Mr. Gelsinger's parents filed a complaint alleging wrongful death,
strict product liability, and other liabilities, noting that the University of
Pennsylvania and its researchers had various financial interests with the
therapy's commercial sponsor, Genovo, Inc. See Compl. for Plaintiff, Gelsinger
v. Tr. of the Univ. of Pa. (filed Sept. 19, 2000), available at
http://www.sskrplaw.com/links/healthcare2.html. The case has since been
settled under undisclosed terms. See Federal Case Is Settled Over Death of
Research Subject, 20 HuM. RES. REP. 1 (Apr. 2005).
216. The FDA issued warning letters to the University of Pennsylvania's
Institute for Human Gene Therapy and its researchers for, among other things,
failure to report previous subjects' increased liver enzymes. See Letters from
Steven A. Masiello, Director, Office of Compliance and Biologics Quality, Center
for Biologics Evaluation and Research, to James M. Wilson, Institute for
Human Gene Therapy, University of Pennsylvania (Mar. 3, 2000 and July 3,
2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/foi/warningletters/m3897n.pdf and
http://www.fda.gov/foilwarningletters/m3435n.pdf; Letter from Steven A.
Masiello, Director, Office of Compliance and Biologics Quality, Center for
Biologics Evaluation and Research, to Mark L. Batshaw, Children's National
Medical Center (Nov. 30, 2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/foi/nidpoe/
n141.pdf.
217. Barnes, supra note 213, at 547.
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institutions have sought to ensure confidence in their
scientific work by limiting their researchers' roles as
entrepreneurs through conflicts of interest policies. These
policies have been highly variable and discretionary in the
levels of financial interests requiring disclosure as well as
the penalties for noncompliance. Recent guidance from the
DHHS as well as industry groups, however, has given
structure policies for handling conflicts of interest in human
subjects research, with standards emphasizing disclosure,
transparency, and oversight rather than prohibiting specific
financial relationship. 218
E. Managing Conflicts of Interests in Academic Medical
Centers
The area of greatest concern in human subjects
research is patient safety, and recent actions taken in both
the public sector and the private sector have provided some
guidance regarding investigator and institutional conflicts
of interest. 219  Aside from regulations requiring and
governing Institutional Review Boards (IRBs),220 there are
regulations requiring investigators receiving PHS funds to
disclose certain levels of financial interest to their
institution.221 Investigators receiving PHS funding must
disclose potential financial conflicts to the designated officer
in their institution and it is up to the institution to ensure
that financial interests do not adversely affect human
subjects research.222 Until relatively recently, there have
not been specific requirements for the review process or
218. See generally id. at 529-31.
219. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH TO PROTECTING RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS (October 2002), at
http://www.iom.edu/Object.File/ Master/4/157/ O.pdf.
220. HHS requires that PHS funded research involving human subjects
conform to subject protection requirements codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2004).
Research conducted to fulfill requirements of the FDA must conform to
comparable regulations at 21 CFR pts. 50, 56 (2005). These regulations specify,
among other things, that IRBs must review all proposed research, ensure that
the benefit to risk ration is reasonable, patient selection is appropriate and
equitable and patients freely consent. See id.
221. See 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (2004).
222. Id.
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appropriate corrective measures. 223 Not surprisingly, this
has resulted in considerable variability among academic
medical centers in the content of their policies and their
approaches to enforcement. 224 On May 12, 2004, DHHS
issued its final guidance document regarding financial
conflicts of interest in human subjects research. In addition,
the AAMC issued its guidelines for managing financial
interests held by investigators and by institutions in 2001
and 2202, respectively. The focus of these public and
private guidelines has been on the protection of patients,
however, many of the recommendations described would
serve to ensure the integrity of pre-clinical research as well.
In the public sector, DHHS' final guidance document,
Financial Relationships and Interests in Research Involving
Human Subjects: Guidance for Human Subject Protection,
replaces its interim guidance issued more than three years
earlier.225 The guidance document augments existing
regulations for institutions and investigators receiving
Public Health Service funding (the majority through NIH or
NAS), and applies to human subject research conducted or
supported by HHS or regulated by the FDA.226 The
guidance provides points for IRBs, institutions, and
investigators to consider (e.g., "Given the financial
relationships involved, is the institution an appropriate site
for the research?"), but does not provide criteria for
resolving questions and ensuring that financial interests do
223. See e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 50.604(f) requiring that the institution of the
investigator seeking PHS funding "establish adequate enforcement mechanisms
and provide for sanctions where appropriate."
224. S. Van McCrary et al., A National Survey of Policies on Disclosure of
Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 343 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1621 (2000).
See also Bernard Lo et al., Conflict-of-Interest Policies for Investigators in
Clinical Trials, 343 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1616 (2000). Lo and colleagues reviewed
the policies of leading universities and found that, while all universities require
disclosure of financial interests, there was variation regarding whom on the
research staff was required to disclose and what levels of financial interests
should be disclosed. See Lo, supra. Penalties for non-disclosure also varied and
were discretionary. See id. at 1618.
225. See Financial Relationships and Interests in Research Involving
Human Subjects: Guidance for Human Subject Protection, 69 Fed. Reg. 26,393
(May 12, 2004).
226. See id.
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not compromise the welfare of research subjects. 227
Institutions are, however, encouraged to consider
establishing a conflict of interest committee separate from
the IRB to establish criteria and policies to deal with
conflicts independently of the IRB. 228 Additional guidance
addresses IRB operations to ensure that members are free
of conflicts of interest as well as actions that investigators
should consider, including having an independent
individual obtain consent. 229 The guidelines do not seek to
reduce relationships among industry, academia and
investigators, only to examine them.
Likewise, the core principle underlying the recent
reports and guidelines from the Association of American
Medical Colleges is that financial interests in human
subjects research are not categorically improper. 230
Financial interests are, however, viewed as potentially
problematic, and the AAMC recommends a specific process
to handle researchers with potential conflicts of interest in
human research, using an institutional conflict of interest
committee. 231 Central to this process is the principle that a
significant financial interest creates a rebuttable
presumption that the individual (and institution) may not
conduct the research involving human subjects, regardless
227. See id. at 26,396. For example, institutions are directed to consider
whether payments per research participant or incentive payments are
reasonable without guidelines for reasonableness. See id.
228. See id. at 26,396-97.
229. See id.
230. See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, PROTECTING
SUBJECTS, PRESERVING TRUST, PROMOTING PROGRESS: POLICY AND GUIDELINES
FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL FINANCIAL INTEREST IN HUMAN SUBJECTS
RESEARCH 3 (December 2001) [hereinafter "AAMC I], available at
http://www.aamc.org/members/coitf/firstreport.pdf. See also ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, PROTECTING SUBJECTS, PRESERVING TRUST,
PROMOTING PROGRESS II: PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OVERSIGHT OF
AN INSTITUTION'S FINANCIAL INTERESTS IN HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 2-3
(October 2002) [hereinafter "AAlMC II"], available at
http://www.aamc.org/members/ coitf/2002coireport.pdf. The AAMC is the
organization representing U.S. medical schools and teaching hospitals
responsible for conducting most extra-mural (outside the NIH) federally funded
preclinical and clinical research.
231. See AAMC I, supra note 230, at 14-19. Institutional COI committees
are required for recipients of PHS funding; AAMC advocates using the same
committee to review all potential conflicts in human subject research,
regardless of the funding source. See id.
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of the source of the funding for the research. 232 The AAMC
recommendations envision a separate institutional conflict
of interest committee to review financial interest
disclosures before protocols are sent for IRB review. The
institutional conflict of interest committee would be the
forum for analyzing requests by financially interested
researchers to rebut disqualifying presumptions. The
committee would also ensure disinterested monitoring if
conflicts are significant and extenuating circumstances
require that the financially interested investigator conduct
the research. Their recommendations would be
communicated to the IRB responsible for ensuring patient
safety for the study under review. 233
A more challenging dilemma is presented when the
institution conducting the human subjects research has
significant financial interests in the outcome of the
research. This occurs when the institution has developed
the therapy in the lab, holds the patent, and is conducting
Phase I testing or other clinical testing, as was the case
with the University of Pennsylvania in the research in
which Mr. Gelsinger participated. 234 Institutional conflicts
also result from financial interests of senior management or
trustees in research that might affect or reasonably appear
to affect the institutional processes for the conduct, review,
or oversight of human services research. 235 The AAMC
report for institutional conflicts of interest emphasizes the
need for separation of human subjects research oversight
from financial interests oversight. 236 This is accomplished
in many institutions by a separate department for
technology transfer (i.e., transfer of laboratory bench
research to therapeutic applications). In addition,
foundations handling endowments should be separate legal
232. The definition of "significant financial interest is the same definition
employed by PHS in requiring reporting disclosure at 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (2004).
Unlike the Supplemental Regulation applicable to NIH employees, any
employee can hold equity and accept consulting fees lower than de minimus
levels. See 5 C.F.R. § 5501.110(d).
233. AAMC I, supra note 230, at 14-15.
234. Gatter, supra note 196, at 351.
235. See AAMC II, supra note 230, at 2-3.
236. See id.
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entities. 237 Even with these separations, however, certain
financial interests require the same level of scrutiny as
described for individual researchers. 238 These circumstances
include: assignment of royalties for the investigational
product; any equity interests in non-publicly traded
companies acquired through licensing institutional
technology; equity interests greater than $100,000 acquired
through licensing technology to a publicly traded company;
or, when institutional officials hold significant financial
interests in the product for which they have responsibility
for overseeing research.23 9 The report also lists other
potential conflicts unique to institutions (e.g., substantial
donations or endowments from commercial sponsors;
acquisition of major equipment from commercial entity).240
If an institution or senior institutional officers (e.g.,
deans, chairs, department heads) have a financial interest
in the outcome of research, their interests may be aligned
with commercial interests, including industry sponsors.
Since excess funds from commercial sponsors may be used
for other socially desirable ends, it may be in the best
interest to sever funding. Rather, dealings with for-profit
biomedical firms should be at arm's length, so that the
goals of the commercial sponsor do not skew the research
agenda of the institution.241
As with individual conflicts of interest, the key is
disclosure of interests and review. The AAMC recommends
that institutions conducting human subject research
maintain a standing conflicts of interest committee to
review these conflicts.2 42 The AAMC strongly urged
237. See id. at 4.
238. See id. at 6-7.
239. See id. An institutional official has a "significant financial interest" if
the relationship with the commercial entity meets the criteria established
under PHS Rule (i.e., consulting fees or honoraria which, in aggregate, exceed
de minimus levels, serve as an officer, director or board member, or serve on a
scientific advisory board of a commercial sponsor with regard to research being
conducted at the institution). See id.
240. See id. at 7-8.
241. See Gordon DuVal, Institutional Conflicts of Interest: Protecting
Human Subjects, Scientific Integrity, and Institutional Accountability, 32 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 613, 620 (2004).
242. AAMC II, supra note 230, at 9. Institutional conflicts of interest
committee members should have sufficient seniority, expertise, and
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institutions to consider forming institutional conflicts of
interest committees separate from mechanisms to consider
individual conflicts of interest. 243  It is strongly
recommended that at least one member of the committee be
from outside the institution to "increase the transparency of
the committee's deliberations and enhance the credibility of
its determinations. '244 Technology licensing should have
reporting obligations to this committee when an institution
is likely to take any equity or ownership interests or royalty
payments from potential sponsors for HSR.
Ideally, then, financial conflicts on the part of
investigators or institutions are reviewed and managed
before related research protocols are reviewed by IRBs. In
some cases, however, investigators or institutions will have
direct financial interests in research outcomes. If so, the
presumption is that these interests conflict with patient
care and scientific integrity. The presumption may be
rebutted when circumstances are compelling (e.g., there is
limited expertise in conducting the type of research
required) and the committee has approved an effective
conflict management plan.245 Conflict management plans
may include requiring disclosure of interests to study
participants, obtaining patient consent using only
disinterested investigators, and more frequent review of the
research protocol by the IRB. This management plan is
communicated to the IRB with jurisdiction over research.
This saves already overburdened IRBs from shouldering the
responsibility for evaluating conflicts of interest; rather,
IRBs act as a second level of review for the conflict of
interest committee's review. The AAMC recommends that a
second level review by an external IRB be considered,
particularly when institutional conflicts are involved.
independence to evaluate the competing interests at stake and . . . should be
independent of the direct line of authority for human subjects research
oversight within the institution. See AAMC I, supra note 230, at 14.
243. See AAMC I, supra note 230, at 7-8.
244. See id. at 14.
245. Factors to be considered include: nature of the science, nature of the
interest, how closely the interest is related to the research, the degree of risk
that the research poses to human subjects, and the degree to which the interest
may be affected by the research ... unique qualifications of the institution and
the experience and expertise of investigators.
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The most essential component in a financial conflict of
interest policy is complete, accurate and timely disclosure
on the part of individual investigators to the individual or
committee responsible for overseeing these issues.246
Patient safety and scientific integrity remain the priorities
for all concerned and where there are significant financial
interests in research outcomes on the part of investigators
or institutions, the reviewers must presume that the
research cannot be conducted without management of the
conflict (e.g., through divestiture or reassignment of
research tasks) and oversight. The conflicts presented
where institutions and their investigators hold patent
rights in therapeutic agent to be tested for toxicity and
dosing in patients will remain the most difficult to manage.
Recommendations that a separate institutional conflict of
interest committee have at least one independent member
from outside the institution 247 may not be sufficient, unless
there is an institution-wide (in fact, industry-wide)
commitment to full disclosure with independent review of
all such research.
CONCLUSION
The web of conflicting roles examined above may be an
unavoidable consequence of modem medical research structures.
248
The narrow and sophisticated areas of expertise demanded at all
levels of drug development may of necessity circumscribe a limited
pool of players. Effective, coherent regulation requires that the FDA
and industry collaborate and strategize as partners, not
adversaries. "Negotiate, don't dictate" was the essence of the
1995 edict issued by President Clinton in which he directed
all federal agencies to establish cooperative relationships
with regulated parties. 249 Enormous public health benefit
has emerged from the research dialogue between the
246. DuVal, supra note 241. DuVal notes that high-level institutional
officials may also need to make disclosures to an audit or other subcommittee of
the institution's Board of Trustees. See id. at 623.
247. See AAMC II, supra note 230, at 9.
248. Glode, supra note 108, at 321.
249. Memorandum from William J. Clinton, U.S. President, for Heads of
Departments and Agencies, Regulatory Reinvention Initiative 3 (Mar. 4, 1995).
See also Steven P. Croley, Practical Guidance on the Applicability of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, 10 ADMIN. L.J. 111 (1996).
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pharmaceutical industry and academic researchers. The
need for an effective working relationship between the FDA
and industry seems patently obvious. However, intrinsic to
this interactive, dynamic process are potentially
overlapping roles and varying degrees of self-interest, both
actual and perceived. Assuming these realities, conflict
management is essential to effectively stem the erosion of
public trust and minimize damage to the research work
product. The specific flash points that tend to generate
aggressive accusations of agency capture at times of crisis,
such as fast-track approval, user fees, and tolerance of
conflicts among advisory board members are unlikely to
disappear. Nor is it foreseeable that laws creating joint
interests in promising therapies by NIH / academic
researchers and biomedical companies will be amended in
any significant way.
Each of the institutions involved at all levels of the
drug development enterprise could, however, be more
proactive in analyzing and overseeing the so-called hot-
spots. For example, FDA's efforts in moving important new
drugs to market expeditiously will and should remain a
priority; however, internal checks must exist to ensure that
reviewers' concerns about safety are not muted due to
pressures to meet approval timelines. One question to be
addressed is whether the lesser evidentiary burden
applicable under the fast-track approval scheme has been
allowed to spill over to the traditional drug approval
process. Oversight on this issue lies squarely with the FDA.
The agency's ability to challenge a company's submissions
should not be constrained by industry-imposed approval
schedules. Drug development is fraught with uncertainty
and risk. Why then should rigid timelines be imposed on
the FDA review and approval process, potentially hindering
an appropriate assessment of that uncertainty and risk?
Given the fiscal exigencies of the federal government,
Congress is unlikely to amend the user fee scheme;
however, the rigidity and apparent pressures imposed on
FDA review staff by the performance goals, as reported by
the DHHS Office of Inspector General, should provide
sufficient incentive to recalibrate future user fee time
commitments, and to provide additional resources for more
rigorous post-marketing surveillance either within or
2005] 715
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outside of the FDA's Office of New Drugs. 250 NIH and
academic medical centers also have the necessary tools to
ensure scientific integrity and patient safety by enforcing
broad disclosure requirements and internal oversight when
signals of conflict emerge. The Office of Government Ethics
is ideally situated to use the disclosure and oversight
process as an opportunity to define norms for ethical
scientific behavior even if some of the prohibitions prove
difficult or unworkable in practice.
The timeless logic of transparency would seem to
provide a governing principle when reshaping policies
directed to both institutional and personal conflicts. The
model provided by the EMEA to deal with conflicts of
interest among its Scientific Committee members
recommends itself as one route the FDA could follow. Post-
meeting revelations of FDA Advisory Committee members'
conflicts of interest are a consequence of a timid FDA policy
on this issue, one that unnecessarily results in public
challenge to the integrity of the process. Likewise, the
experience of academic medical centers in applying AAMC
recommendations for dealing with conflicts of interest, an
emphasis on disclosure and oversight rather than
prohibition of financial relationships, may be informative
for DHHS as it evaluates its supplemental regulations for
NIH scientists.
250. See FDA's REVIEW PROCESS, supra note 5.
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